The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality: Reconciling Canons of Statutory Interpretation with Textualism by Born, Natascha
 
541 
THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY: 
RECONCILING CANONS OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION WITH TEXTUALISM* 
NATASCHA BORN* 
U.S. courts have relied on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to limit the application of federal law beyond U.S. 
borders for more than two centuries.  While courts have fairly 
consistently concluded that federal statutes lacking any express 
territorial limitations should not be construed to apply worldwide, 
the doctrinal tests and justifications for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality have varied significantly over time.  U.S. courts 
have variously interpreted federal law to apply only within U.S. 
borders, to conduct abroad that produced effects in U.S. territory, 
where reasonable pursuant to a balancing test, and—most recently, 
under Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.—where the “focus” of 
the statute at issue was in the United States.  In some cases, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied to override 
the most plausible reading of statutory language. 
This Article considers whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is consistent with modern textualism.  Textualism 
instructs courts to focus primarily on implementing statutory text, 
read in context.  As a consequence, textualists reject substantive 
canons of statutory interpretation that displace the best reading of 
the statutory text unless a canon is so ingrained that it forms part of 
the legal background against which Congress legislates.  This Article 
concludes that none of the various doctrinal variations of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has been invoked 
consistently enough to qualify as such a background convention.  
Proponents of textualism should therefore no longer apply the 
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presumption to supplant the most plausible interpretation of a 
statute.  Nonetheless, courts’ consistent reliance on different 
iterations of the presumption to limit statutes that are phrased 
universally (referring, for example, to “any seaman,” or “every 
contract”) and that contain no express territorial limitations gives 
rise to a narrower canon that conforms with textualist tenets:  Courts 
may interpret such universally worded statutes to have some limits 
consistently with textualism.  This Article further contends that 
textualism should be understood to require a consistent standard for 
addressing the extraterritorial applicability of universally worded or 
ambiguous statutes in order to further objectives of consistency and 
predictability.  The Article suggests that an international law 
presumption is the most plausible approach and is preferable to the 
analysis set forth in Morrison.  Finally, the Article concludes more 
broadly that textualists should consider adopting substantive 
canons to resolve ambiguity in other statutes that present recurring 
issues of statutory interpretation, just as statutes that are ambiguous 
as to their geographic scope present a recurring interpretive issue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The presumption against extraterritoriality has evolved 
substantially since its inception in the early nineteenth century.  
While U.S. courts have fairly uniformly concluded that, absent 
statutory text to the contrary, federal statutes should be construed 
as containing some territorial limits, the doctrinal tests and 
justifications for the presumption have varied significantly.  During 
the nineteenth century, U.S. courts interpreted federal law 
consistently with prevailing international law limits on the exercise 
of legislative jurisdiction, which at that time generally required 
construing statutes to apply only territorially.  In the twentieth 
century, courts applied U.S. law abroad more frequently pursuant 
to a variety of new doctrinal tests that were neither consistently 
applied nor reconciled.  While courts still sometimes invoked a 
strictly territorial presumption, they also repeatedly applied U.S. 
statutes to conduct abroad that produced effects in U.S. territory or 
when doing so would be reasonable according to a multi-factor 
balancing test.  Beginning in 1991, the Supreme Court cited the 
presumption more frequently and often, but not invariably, applied 
a strictly territorial iteration of the presumption.  As a consequence, 
by 2010, there was general agreement that judicial application of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality was incoherent and 
unpredictable.1 
Responding to these concerns, the Supreme Court in 2010 
introduced a new two-part analysis in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd.2  Under Morrison, courts first determine whether a federal 
statute applies extraterritorially by assessing whether Congress has 
provided a “clear” or “affirmative” indication that it should.3  If not, 
courts then determine whether application of the statute in a given 
case would be impermissibly extraterritorial by identifying the 
statute’s “focus” and assessing whether that focus occurred outside 
the United States.  The Morrison analysis was a significant change 
from prior iterations of the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Against this history, modern textualists must assess whether the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is consistent with textualism 
and, if not, whether textualism provides an alternate means of 
 
 1 Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1019, 1028 (2011). 
 2 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 3 Id. at 265.  
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assessing statutes’ territorial reach.  Most fundamentally, textualism 
instructs judges to give effect to the statutory text enacted by the 
legislature,4 and textualists focus primarily on how a reasonable 
reader would understand the statutory language “placed alongside 
the remainder of the corpus juris.”5  Textualists accordingly embrace 
linguistic canons, which help courts discern the meaning of 
statutory text.  By contrast, substantive canons that displace the best 
or most plausible reading of the text contradict the textualist 
principle “that a faithful agent must adhere to the product of the 
legislative process.”6  Textualism therefore recognizes the legitimacy 
of only those substantive canons that resolve statutory ambiguity 
(rather than displacing the best reading of statutory text), or that 
have been applied so consistently that they form part of the 
background against which Congress legislates.7  
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a substantive 
canon because it requires courts to restrict the territorial reach of 
federal law and thus implement a substantive policy external to the 
statute at issue.  As a consequence, unless it forms part of the 
background against which Congress legislates, the presumption is 
incompatible with textualism insofar as it is applied to displace the 
best reading of the statutory text.  Despite the presumption’s early 
nineteenth century roots, its application has varied so frequently 
and significantly that no single doctrinal standard qualifies as such 
a background convention.  Judges seeking to comply with 
textualism should therefore no longer apply the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to displace the best reading of statutory 
text.  The Morrison analysis is particularly problematic for textualists 
in this regard, notwithstanding the fact that it was articulated by 
Justice Scalia, one of textualism’s staunchest proponents.  Morrison 
requires Congress to make its intent for a statute to apply 
extraterritorially “clear”8 or “unmistakable,”9 supplanting the most 
plausible reading of statutory text unless Congress legislates with 
 
 4 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003). 
 5 John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 16 (2001) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)). 
 6 Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
109, 124 (2010).  
 7 Manning, supra note 4, at 2474. 
 8 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265. 
 9 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016). 
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heightened clarity in direct contravention of textualists’ basic 
directive that courts should function as Congress’s faithful agents. 
While U.S. courts have not consistently applied any single 
doctrinal test for the presumption against extraterritoriality, they 
have fairly uniformly recognized that universally worded statutes 
(referring to “any seaman,” for example) should be construed to 
have some territorial limits.  Consistent judicial reliance on different 
iterations of the presumption in those circumstances gives rise to a 
narrower background convention that accords with textualism:  
Universally worded statutes that lack any express territorial 
limitations should not be construed to apply throughout the world, 
and courts may therefore read territorial limits into such statutes 
consistently with textualist principles. 
Textualism permits, and should be understood to require, 
adopting a uniform test to interpret statutes that are universally 
worded or are otherwise ambiguous as to their extraterritorial 
applicability.  Textualists recognize that judges have substantial 
discretion to resolve statutory ambiguity and gaps, but simply 
acknowledging that courts have discretion to construe universally 
worded and ambiguous statutes pursuant to any of the iterations of 
the presumption (and potentially even their own policy preferences) 
is not a satisfactory outcome for textualist analysis.  Applying a 
consistent standard would better achieve textualist objectives of 
consistency and predictability, and serve textualism’s “simple 
ambition . . . to require legislators to accept responsibility for their 
legislative acts.”10 
Determining statutes’ extraterritorial reach is often difficult and 
can implicate multiple States’ regulatory interests, international law, 
fair notice for the regulated, and questions about the feasibility of 
applying U.S. law abroad.  Many approaches to the issue have 
strengths and weaknesses, and none will be completely satisfactory 
in all cases.  Nonetheless, courts should not adopt the two-part 
Morrison analysis.  Morrison’s “focus” test, which determines 
whether a statute is applied extraterritorially by reference to the 
location of its “focus,” bears little relation to the question whether a 
statute should apply in a given case as a matter of congressional 
intent or policy.  There is also little to suggest that the “focus” test 
takes into account the considerations that underpin the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, including international law, U.S. and 
 
 10 John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
673, 738 (1997). 
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foreign sovereign interests, fairness, and comity.  In addition, the 
“focus” test is difficult to administer coherently, because identifying 
a statute’s “focus” is inherently imprecise and uncertain and 
because locating that “focus” in a specific case presents special 
concerns for complex transnational cases.   
It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine the precise 
contours of a new, uniformly applied substantive canon, but the 
most promising approach appears to be a presumption that 
Congress intends to legislate up to public and private international 
law limits on legislative jurisdiction, at least with respect to civil law.  
That approach would ensure that U.S. law governs where the United 
States has substantial regulatory interests while avoiding 
international conflicts that can arise when U.S. law is applied in 
violation of international law limitations on legislative jurisdiction.  
In addition, this approach best accords with textualist principles 
because U.S. courts have long (albeit inconsistently) looked to 
international law in applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 
The conclusion that textualism should be understood to require 
adopting a consistent approach for determining the extraterritorial 
reach of universally worded and ambiguous statutes suggests a 
broader insight.  Where numerous statutes present a recurring 
question of statutory interpretation that cannot be resolved by 
reference to the usual tools of textualist statutory construction (just 
as statutes are often ambiguous as to their geographic scope), 
textualists should adopt a consistent substantive canon for resolving 
that ambiguity.  The judicial discretion that ambiguous statutes 
necessarily entail can be harnessed to formulate new substantive 
canons that permit courts to apply such statutes consistently and 
predictably.  That approach not only gives regulated parties fair 
notice of the law, but also allows them to hold Congress accountable 
for the predictable results of its legislation.  
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part 1 provides an overview 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality and its application 
over the past two centuries.  Part 2 then examines the core tenets of 
textualism and demonstrates that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, as it is currently applied, cannot properly be 
classified as a canon of statutory interpretation that accords with 
textualism.  Part 3 contends that textualist judges should no longer 
rely on the presumption against extraterritoriality to displace the 
best reading of the statutory text.  For truly ambiguous statutes and 
universally worded statutes that must be construed to have some 
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limits, textualism should require a single consistent approach.  Part 
4 concludes that textualists should consider developing new 
substantive canons whenever numerous statutes present a recurring 
question of statutory interpretation that cannot be resolved using 
the existing tools of textualist statutory construction. 
1. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
U.S. courts have recognized for over 200 years that a statute 
without any clear definition of its territorial reach should not be 
construed to apply universally throughout the world.11  While the 
presumption against extraterritoriality generally instructs courts to 
avoid giving U.S. statutes extraterritorial effect,12 it has evolved 
substantially, and sometimes dramatically, over time and has not 
been applied consistently.13  Over the past decade (2010 through 
2020), the Supreme Court has sought to restore order with a new 
two-part analysis announced in Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd.14  The Morrison analysis marked a significant change from 
previous iterations of the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
 
 11 See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818). 
 12 See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he 
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or 
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is 
done.”); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a 
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.’” (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))).  See 
generally Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 181. 
 13 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule 
for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 128-29 (2010); 
Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1028 (“[T]he only thing courts and scholars seem to agree 
on is that the law in this area is a mess.”); Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: 
Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1460-61 (2008) 
(“Condemned as incoherent and convoluted, a patchwork of incompatible rules 
presently governs legislative jurisdiction.  Some scholars go so far as to describe the 
Court’s extraterritoriality decisions as patently inconsistent, if not hopelessly 
confused.”); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2162, 2235 (2002) (The presumption against extraterritoriality “has been 
strongly critiqued both normatively and for its inconsistent application.”); 
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953) (Justice Jackson, discussing the 
extraterritorial application of shipping laws, admitted that “[i]t would not be 
candid to claim that our courts have arrived at satisfactory standards or apply those 
that they profess with perfect consistency.”). 
 14 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/1
2020] Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 549 
and it is not yet clear whether and how the new analysis will be 
applied over the long term. 
This section analyzes this evolution of the doctrinal tests and 
rationales for the presumption against extraterritoriality over the 
past 200 years in four parts: Before 1909, U.S. courts usually 
construed U.S. law to apply only territorially in line with then-
prevailing international law limits on legislative jurisdiction.  
Between 1909 and 1991, U.S. courts applied U.S. law abroad more 
often, developing a variety of different doctrinal tests and rationales.  
Between 1991 and 2010, the Supreme Court frequently relied on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and often, but not 
exclusively, interpreted it to require a strictly territorial construction 
of U.S. law.  Finally, over the past decade, the Supreme Court has 
generally applied Morrison’s two-part analysis and has sought to 
reconcile the varying rationales for the presumption. 
1.1. Constitutional Background and Development of the Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality Between 1804 and 1909 
In order to conclude that a U.S. statute applies 
extraterritorially,15 courts must determine both that Congress has 
legislative jurisdiction (or the constitutional authority to legislate 
extraterritorially),16 and that Congress exercised that authority.17  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress has the 
constitutional power to enact extraterritorial legislation, ruling that 
“Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial 
boundaries of the United States.”18  While federal appellate courts 
 
 15 Traditionally statutes were generally understood to apply 
“extraterritorially” when they regulated conduct occurring beyond U.S. borders.  
Parrish, supra note 13, at 1462 (“When a state uses its legislative jurisdiction to 
regulate the conduct of those outside its borders, the law has been applied 
extraterritorially.”); Kramer, supra note 12, at 181. 
 16 Legislative jurisdiction, Congress’s power to make law, is distinct from the 
executive branch’s enforcement jurisdiction or the judiciary’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 401 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987); Parrish, supra note 13, at 1462. 
 17 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 
1945) (“[T]he only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the 
liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so.”). 
 18 EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).  The Court was likely referring to 
Congress’s authority to prescribe law, not literally to enforce it.  The Constitution 
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have interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution to limit the extraterritorial applicability of 
federal law (and particularly criminal law), they have very rarely 
sustained due process challenges,19 and the Supreme Court has not 
yet considered whether the Due Process Clause imposes any such 
limits.20  It is generally accepted that Congress’s constitutional 
authority to legislate extraterritorially is not diminished when 
applying U.S. law abroad violates or may violate international law,21 
although some federal appellate courts have looked to international 
law in determining when the Due Process Clause prohibits 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.22  In sum, it is well-settled 
that the Constitution does not categorically prohibit Congress from 
enacting statutes that apply beyond U.S. borders and, on the 
contrary, imposes few restrictions on Congress’s power to enact 
such laws. 
Given Congress’s broad constitutional authority, U.S. courts 
need ordinarily conclude only that Congress in fact legislated 
extraterritorially as “a matter of statutory construction” in order to 
 
permits Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3, to effectuate treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause, see id. cl. 18, 
and to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,” id. cl. 10.  See 
generally Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1030-31.  Courts and commentators have for the 
most part devoted relatively little attention to defining or elaborating these 
potential sources of constitutional authority for Congress to legislate 
extraterritorially.  See Baston v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 850, 851 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (noting that “this Court has never 
thoroughly explored the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 
VA. L. REV. 949, 951-52 (2010) (explaining that the Foreign Commerce Clause 
“remains an incredibly under-analyzed source of congressional power”); Eugene 
Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 150 (2009) (describing the impact of the Define and Punish 
Clause on Congress’s power to legislate extraterritorially as “a serious and 
previously unexplored question”). 
 19 Julie Rose O’Sullivan, The Extraterritorial Application of Federal Criminal 
Statutes: Analytical Roadmap, Normative Conclusions, and a Plea to Congress for 
Direction, 106 GEO. L.J. 1021, 1080 (2018). 
 20 Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
323, 347 (2012). 
 21 Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 L. & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 5 (1992); Meyer, supra note 13, at 125. 
 22 See cases cited infra note 358. 
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apply a statute abroad.23  U.S. courts developed the presumption 
against extraterritoriality for interpretive guidance because many 
U.S. statutes are silent, ambiguous, or implausibly expansive as to 
their extraterritorial reach.24  Applying such statutes without any 
territorial limitations was regarded by courts as an absurd result that 
Congress would not have intended, and which would have created 
the potential for conflicts of law and friction with other nations.  For 
instance, in 1818, the Supreme Court held  in United States v. Palmer25 
that a reference to “any person or persons” in a statute penalizing 
certain crimes committed “upon the high seas” was “broad enough 
to comprehend every human being,” and must instead be limited 
according to the “intent of the legislature.”26  Similarly, in 1953 in 
Lauritzen v. Larsen,27 the Court noted that the Jones Act by its terms 
applied to “any seaman,”28 and, “read literally,” provided recourse 
in U.S. courts under U.S. law “to all alien seafaring men injured 
anywhere in the world in service of watercraft of every foreign 
nation.”29  Rejecting this literal reading as implausible, the Court 
concluded that such generally worded statutes must be construed to 
have some geographic limits.30 
U.S. courts developed the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in part by reference to rules of public international 
law that prevailed early in the nineteenth century.  The presumption 
originated as an application of the Charming Betsy canon,31 which 
required courts to construe U.S. statutes so as not to violate 
international law unless no “other possible construction remains.”32  
 
 23 See, e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (“Both parties concede, as they must, that 
Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of 
the United States.  Whether Congress has in fact exercised that authority . . . is a 
matter of statutory construction.” (citation omitted)); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 
281, 284-85 (1949). 
 24 See Meyer, supra note 13, at 184-86 (providing extensive list of criminal laws 
without any territorial limitation); Born, supra note 21, at 7 (“[I]n the overwhelming 
majority of cases . . . federal statutes are couched in the most general terms and 
suggest no meaningful geographic limits.”). 
 25 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818). 
 26 Id. at 631-32. 
 27 345 U.S. 571 (1953). 
 28 Id. at 576-77 (citing Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952) (current version at 46 
U.S.C. § 30104)). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 592-93. 
 31 Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1058-60. 
 32 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see 
Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1060. 
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Specifically, the Charming Betsy canon instructed courts to determine 
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes by construing them not to 
violate international law limitations on the United States’ legislative 
jurisdiction. 
During the nineteenth century, the Charming Betsy canon and its 
doctrinal offshoot, the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
required the strictly territorial construction of U.S. law due to 
corresponding international law limits on prescriptive jurisdiction.33  
Under nineteenth century conceptions of international law, nation-
states’ legislative jurisdiction was largely limited to their territorial 
boundaries.34  Consequently, when U.S. courts applied the Charming 
Betsy canon, they construed statutes to apply strictly territorially to 
avoid violating those international law limits on legislative 
jurisdiction.35  Narrow exceptions, such as nation-states’ rights to 
assert legislative jurisdiction over their nationals abroad, were 
acknowledged, but rarely invoked.36   
For example, in 1824, the Supreme Court in The Apollon37 
construed a federal statute to apply only within U.S. territory, based 
on the principle that U.S. law should be interpreted not to violate 
international law.38  In an opinion by Justice Story, the Court held 
that U.S. customs law was not applicable to the French ship 
“Apollon” while outside U.S. territory.39  Relying on “the general 
principles of the law of nations,” the Court held that “[t]he laws of 
no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far 
as regards its own citizens.”40  Thus, it concluded that “general and 
 
 33 Born, supra note 21, at 8-21. 
 34 Id. at 8-19 (“Most public international law authorities vigorously embraced 
the territoriality doctrine” and “Joseph Story’s classic Commentaries on the Conflict 
of Laws . . . adopted a strictly territorial approach to choice of law . . . . Story’s 
territoriality principle dominated conflict of laws thinking, in the United States and 
elsewhere, during the nineteenth century.”). 
 35 Id. at 10 (“During the nineteenth century, a common application of the 
Charming Betsy presumption was to incorporate the American understanding that 
international law forbids the extraterritorial application of national laws.” (citing 
Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279 (1808); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 
(3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824); United 
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933))). 
 36 Id. at 13-14. 
 37 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824). 
 38 Id. at 369-70. 
 39 Id. at 368-72.  The Court held that the Apollon was located in U.S. territory 
under U.S. law, but not under international law, and consequently treated the 
Apollon as though it were outside of U.S. borders.  Id. at 368-69. 
 40 Id. at 369-70. 
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comprehensive” provisions in U.S. law “must always be restricted 
in construction, to places and persons, upon whom the Legislature 
have authority and jurisdiction.”41  
Almost a century later, in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit 
Co.,42 the Supreme Court reaffirmed this strict version of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  The plaintiff, a U.S. 
corporation, sued the defendant, also a U.S. corporation, for 
anticompetitive behavior that had taken place abroad.43  In an 
opinion authored by Justice Holmes, the Court held that the 
Sherman Act did not apply,44 citing both conflict of laws (private 
international law) and public international law principles.  
Applying the then-prevailing “vested rights” conflict of laws 
doctrine under which an act is governed by the law of the state in 
which it occurred,45 the Court held that “[a]ll legislation is prima 
facie territorial.”46  The Court also held that the extraterritorial 
application of municipal law “would be unjust” and “an 
interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the 
comity of nations.”47  Therefore, “in case of doubt,” statutes 
containing general or universal language should be interpreted “as 
intended to be confined in [their] operation and effect to the 
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and 
legitimate power.”48 
1.2. 1909-1991: Inconsistent Erosion of the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality 
In the twentieth century, U.S. courts changed their approach to 
interpreting the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes in several 
 
 41 Id. at 370. 
 42 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 43 Id. at 354-55. 
 44 Id. at 357. 
 45 Id. at 356.  See generally William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-
Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 121-23 
(1998); Kramer, supra note 12, at 186-87. 
 46 213 U.S. at 357.  Justice Holmes provided that “the general and almost 
universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done,” id. at 356, 
recognizing the potential for certain narrow exceptions, id. at 355-56. 
 47 Id. at 356. 
 48 Id. at 357. 
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important ways.  First, U.S. courts weakened the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to permit applying U.S. statutes abroad 
more frequently, adopting an array of doctrinal tests and rationales 
that were neither consistently applied nor reconciled.49  U.S. courts 
at times continued to apply a strictly territorial version of the 
presumption, but also construed statutes to apply extraterritorially 
where the case had a sufficient nexus to the United States or the 
conduct in question had produced effects in the United States. 
Second, U.S. courts began to develop a presumption against 
extraterritoriality that was independent of the Charming Betsy canon 
and its reference to international law.50  At the same time, however, 
courts also continued to cite international law and comity to justify 
and give content to the presumption against extraterritoriality;51 
they also occasionally invoked the Charming Betsy canon as a 
separate hurdle to applying a statute extraterritorially.52   
 
 49 Discerning unifying themes in U.S. courts’ use of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and the Charming Betsy canon during the twentieth century is 
difficult, but some commentators have nonetheless attempted to do so.  See, e.g., 
Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of 
Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of 
Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 304 (1996) (“U.S. 
law has been applied extraterritorially when that has served the national interest of 
the United States or its corporate actors, and it has been given a territorial 
application when a restrictive interpretation would serve those same ends.”); 
Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 601 (1990) (“[C]ourts appear to be 
using outcome-determinative tests to consistently grant or deny extraterritorial 
claims according to the type of statute involved in the dispute.  They consistently 
grant extraterritorial relief under ‘market statutes,’ like the antitrust and securities 
laws . . . .  In contrast, ‘nonmarket statutes’ providing employment or 
environmental protections are consistently denied extraterritorial applications.”). 
 50 See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) (making no 
reference to international law limits on legislative jurisdiction or to international 
comity, and instead justifying the presumption based on Congress’s presumed 
focus on domestic concerns). 
 51 See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-82 (1953) (turning to international 
law to determine extraterritorial applicability of the Jones Act); EEOC v. Aramco, 
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (holding that the presumption “serves to protect against 
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result 
in international discord”); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 
155, 164-67 (2004) (holding that U.S. law is construed to comport with international 
law and comity, which the Court “must assume[] Congress ordinarily seeks to 
follow”); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(inquiring whether “[a]s a matter of international comity and fairness” the Sherman 
Act should apply). 
 52 Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: 
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 489-90 (1998) 
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Finally, as international law and state practice, frequently led by 
the United States, moved away from a strictly territorial conception 
of legislative jurisdiction in the twentieth century, U.S. courts 
relying on international law and comity in construing U.S. statutes 
did so as well.53  Citing international law and state practice as they 
had in the previous century, U.S. courts applied different tests and 
reached different outcomes than they had previously. 
1.2.1. Continued Application of a Strictly Territorial Version of the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
The Supreme Court continued to apply a strictly territorial 
version of the presumption against extraterritoriality in some cases 
between 1909 and 1991.  In Foley Bros. v. Filardo,54 for example, the 
Court held that the Eight Hour Law, requiring overtime payments, 
did not extend to a U.S. citizen employed in Iraq and Iran by private 
contractors building public works for the U.S. government.55  The 
Court held that “legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of 
 
(“[C]ourts often invoke the Charming Betsy canon as a reason for construing 
ambiguous statutes as not having extraterritorial effect.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has created a separate but related canon of construction for this issue, the 
‘presumption against extraterritoriality.’  This presumption is designed, among 
other things, to avoid constructions of statutes that would violate customary 
international law.  The Charming Betsy canon also is invoked as a justification for 
limiting the reach of statutes that are found to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 53 See Born, supra note 21 at 21-29, 67-71 (“The U.S. position on 
extraterritoriality has ultimately won a substantial measure of acceptance in the 
international community. . . . These changes in state practice inevitably altered 
customary international law limits on national legislative jurisdiction.”); Austen L. 
Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 
844-56 (2009) (“[O]ther countries have followed the American extraterritorial 
example . . . .  Over time, the United States’ broad application of its own law 
extraterritorially has created a precedent . . . in other countries.”).  An illustrative 
example of the erosion of territorial notions of legislative jurisdiction in 
international law is the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 
The Case of the S.S. Lotus.  The court explicitly rejected the notion that the legislative 
jurisdiction of states was limited to their territories and held instead that “national 
regulatory efforts are presumptively valid and states claiming that assertions of 
national jurisdiction violate international law have the burden of establishing this.”  
Born, supra note 21, at 24-26 (citing The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 
P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10.). 
 54 336 U.S. 281. 
 55 Id. at 282-85. 
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the United States.”56  The Court then determined that the Eight Hour 
Law did not extend beyond U.S. territory because its language and 
legislative history provided no affirmative indication that it did.57  
This strictly territorial application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality was justified as “a valid approach whereby 
unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained . . . based on 
the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic 
conditions.”58 
1.2.2. The Effects Test 
During the same period (1909-1991), U.S. courts also employed 
an effects test, which generally permits applying U.S. law to 
extraterritorial conduct as long as it produces effects within the 
United States.  For instance, in Ford v. United States,59 foreign 
defendants had participated in a conspiracy to import alcohol into 
the United States in violation of the National Prohibition Act (NPA), 
but had not entered U.S. territory.60  The Court held that the NPA 
applied extraterritorially to the defendants based on “[t]he principle 
that a man, who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a force 
to take effect in it, is answerable at the place where the evil is 
done.”61 
Similarly, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),62 
the Second Circuit employed an effects test to determine the 
extraterritorial applicability of the Sherman Act.63  Judge Learned 
Hand wrote for the Second Circuit, which sat as the court of last 
resort in unusual procedural circumstances.64  Alcoa held that courts 
must construe statutes not to violate public international law or the 
“limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of 
their powers,” which it ruled “generally correspond to those fixed 
 
 56 Id. at 285. 
 57 Id. at 285-91. 
 58 Id. at 285. 
 59 273 U.S. 593 (1927). 
 60 Id. at 600-01, 623. 
 61 Id. at 619-24. 
 62 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 63 Id. at 443-44. 
 64 Dodge, supra note 45, at 124 (“Because the Supreme Court was unable to 
muster a quorum of six Justices, [Alcoa] was referred to the Second Circuit, which 
sat as the court of last resort.”).  
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by the ‘Conflict of Laws,’” or private international law.65  The Second 
Circuit thus looked to conflicts of law principles and public 
international law, just as the Supreme Court had done in American 
Banana.66  While the Supreme Court in American Banana had 
formulated a strictly territorial presumption against 
extraterritoriality when applying these principles,67 the Second 
Circuit instead adopted an effects test.68  The court held that the 
Sherman Act applied extraterritorially to conduct abroad that was 
intended to and did in fact have effects within the United States.69  
The Second Circuit interpreted conflict of laws principles and public 
international law to mandate a very different analysis than the 
Supreme Court had 35 years earlier in American Banana, due in 
significant part to perceived changes in public international law, 
conflict of laws principles, and state practice.70 
1.2.3. The Rule of Reason or Multi-Factor Analysis Derived From 
Conflict of Laws Principles 
Between 1909 and 1991, U.S. courts also cited conflict of laws 
principles in adopting a rule of reason or multi-factor analysis for 
the presumption against extraterritoriality.  Conflict of laws 
thinking evolved after American Banana was decided from the vested 
rights theory to include a multi-factor analysis, sometimes termed 
the “rule of reason.”71  U.S. courts that cited conflict of laws rules to 
define the presumption against extraterritoriality adjusted the 
doctrine accordingly.  Under the rule of reason, courts determining 
which state’s law should govern a case “choose from among the 
interested states the one state with the ‘most significant relationship’ 
to the case.”72  Courts adapting the rule of reason to the presumption 
against extraterritoriality used the same multi-factor analysis to 
 
 65 148 F.2d at 443 (“[W]e are not to read general words, such as those in this 
Act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the 
exercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by 
the ‘Conflict of Laws.’”). 
 66 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. 
 69 Id. at 443-44. 
 70 Born, supra note 21, at 31-32. 
 71 Dodge, supra note 45, at 121. 
 72 Id. at 127-34. 
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determine whether to interpret U.S. law to apply to conduct or 
effects occurring partly outside U.S. borders.73 
For instance, the Supreme Court adopted a “connecting factor” 
test derived partly from conflict of laws principles to determine the 
extraterritorial applicability of the Jones Act in Lauritzen v. Larsen.74  
A Danish sailor had been hired by a Danish citizen to work aboard 
a Danish vessel while temporarily in the United States, and was 
allegedly injured while aboard that ship in a Cuban harbor.75  The 
Court first held, “in accord” with the Charming Betsy canon, that 
“usage as old as the Nation” required interpreting U.S. shipping law 
to apply extraterritorially only if the “international or maritime law” 
on choice of law would provide for the application of U.S. law.76  
International and maritime choice of law rules, the Court held, 
mandated weighing the “connecting factors between the shipping 
transaction regulated and the national interest served by the 
assertion of authority” in order to resolve the conflict between 
Danish and U.S. law.77  The Court concluded that the relevant factors 
under that conflict of laws analysis, such as the place of the wrongful 
act and the nationalities of the ship and plaintiff, counseled against 
applying the Jones Act extraterritorially,78 and therefore construed 
the Act not to apply to the sailor’s injury.79  
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit combined an effects test with a rule 
of reason analysis derived from conflict of laws rules to determine 
the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial applicability in Timberlane Lumber 
Co. v. Bank of America.80  The court reasoned that an effect on U.S. 
commerce was “necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction under the 
antitrust laws,” but not “a sufficient basis on which to determine 
whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a 
matter of international comity and fairness.”81  The court therefore 
adopted a “jurisdictional rule of reason” that required weighing 
numerous factors to assess the conflict of laws and determine 
whether “in the face of it the contacts and interests of the United 
 
 73 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1953); Dodge, supra note 45, at 
127-34. 
 74 345 U.S. at 582. 
 75 Id. at 573. 
 76 Id. at 576-82. 
 77 Id. at 582. 
 78 Id. at 583-91. 
 79 Id. at 592-93. 
 80 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 81 Id. at 613. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/1
2020] Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 559 
States are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.”82  These factors included the degree of conflict with 
foreign law or policy, the effects of the extraterritorial conduct on 
the United States as compared to any effects on other states, and the 
nationality or location of the parties.83  The Ninth Circuit’s approach 
in Timberlane proved influential, at least for a time, with numerous 
lower courts following its reasoning and the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law later adopting a version of its multi-factor 
analysis in Section 403.84  
1.2.4. The “Nature of the Offense” Analysis 
Between 1909 and 1991, U.S. courts also occasionally considered 
whether Congress intended federal criminal law to apply 
extraterritorially by reference to the “nature of the offense” being 
regulated.  In United States v. Bowman,85 the Supreme Court held that 
extraterritorial applicability of U.S. criminal law depended on “the 
purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the 
crime” along with “territorial limitations upon the power and 
jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of 
nations.”86  The Court distinguished between statutes punishing 
crimes committed against private individuals, which do not apply 
abroad unless Congress “say[s] so in the statute,”87 and statutes that 
“are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself 
against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated.”88  For crimes 
against the government, Congress’s intent regarding extraterritorial 
 
 82 Id. at 614-15. 
 83 Id. at 614.  The entire, but explicitly non-exhaustive, list of factors is “the 
degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the 
parties and the locations or principal places of businesses or corporations, the extent 
to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the 
relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those 
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American 
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the 
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct 
abroad.”  Id. 
 84 See generally Born, supra note 21, at 35-39; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987). 
 85 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
 86 Id. at 97-98. 
 87 Id. at 98. 
 88 Id. 
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applicability may “be inferred from the nature of the offense” being 
regulated.89  Courts may infer that a statute applies extraterritorially 
for offenses that “are such that to limit their locus to the strictly 
territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and 
usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds 
as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign 
countries as at home.”90 
1.3. 1991-2010: Increased Application of the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality 
Between 1991 and 2010, the Supreme Court frequently relied on 
the presumption against extraterritoriality and often, but not 
invariably, reverted to a strictly territorial version of the canon.  The 
rationales for the presumption against extraterritoriality shifted 
away from international law towards Congress’s assumed domestic 
focus and, to a lesser extent, separation of powers concerns.  The 
Court rarely cited international law and while it still asserted that 
the presumption serves to prevent unintended conflicts of law, it 
also repeatedly held that the presumption applies even absent any 
such potential conflicts.  During this period, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality thus became almost entirely distinct from 
the Charming Betsy canon and its direction that U.S. courts interpret 
statutes not to violate international law. 
In 1991, the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. 
(Aramco),91 reaffirmed a strictly territorial approach to the 
application of U.S. law, similar to that of American Banana.  The 
Court held that federal law “is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States” “unless a contrary intent 
appears” for two reasons.92  First, a strictly territorial presumption 
was said to implement “unexpressed congressional intent,”93 
because the Court assumes that Congress “is primarily concerned 
with domestic conditions” and “that Congress legislates against the 
backdrop of the presumption.”94  Second, the presumption prevents 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
 92 Id. at 248. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
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“unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations.”95  
Applying this strictly territorial version of the presumption, the 
Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply 
to a U.S. citizen hired in the United States by a U.S. company to 
perform work in Saudi Arabia.  The Court concluded that there was 
no evidence of “the affirmative congressional intent required to 
extend the protections of Title VII beyond our territorial borders.”96  
Two years later, the Supreme Court issued two decisions—Smith 
v. United States97 and Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.98—
articulating a strictly territorial presumption against 
extraterritoriality that applied even though there were no potential 
conflicts of law.99  In Smith, the Court ruled that the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA) did not apply to a construction contractor for a 
U.S. agency who died in Antarctica.  The Court noted that Antarctica 
“has no recognized government,”100 which made it unlikely that 
another state would assert legislative jurisdiction over Smith’s death 
there in conflict with the FTCA.  The Court nonetheless held that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality was applicable, reasoning 
that the canon serves not only to avoid conflicts with other nations’ 
laws, but also reflects “the commonsense notion that Congress 
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”101 
Shortly thereafter, in Sale, the Supreme Court similarly held that 
the protections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
(INA) did not extend to a group of Haitian migrants detained 
outside of U.S. territory by the U.S. Coast Guard.102  The Court of 
Appeals had ruled that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
was inapplicable because there was no risk that the relevant 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 250-59. 
 97 507 U.S. 197 (1993). 
 98 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
 99 In both cases the Court purported to apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality only to bolster conclusions it had already reached by reference to 
other tools of statutory interpretation.  Smith, 507 U.S. at 203-05 (ruling that the 
Federal Tort Claims Act did not apply extraterritorially largely due to the statute’s 
text and structure, and relying on the presumption against extraterritoriality to 
resolve “any lingering doubt”); Sale, 509 U.S. at 171-77 (holding that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) did not apply to certain Haitian 
migrants outside of U.S. territory based mainly on the text, structure, and history 
of the INA, and relying on the presumption against extraterritoriality to bolster this 
conclusion). 
 100 507 U.S. at 201. 
 101 Id. at 204 n.5. 
 102 509 U.S. at 158-60, 171-77, 188. 
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provision of the INA, which was enforceable “only in United States 
courts against the United States Attorney General, would conflict 
with the laws of other nations.”103  The Supreme Court rejected that 
conclusion and held that the presumption was applicable because it 
“has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict with the 
laws of other nations.”104  The Court instead alluded briefly to the 
separation of powers as an alternate rationale, holding that the 
“presumption has special force when we are construing treaty and 
statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for 
which the President has unique responsibility.”105 
In other decisions issued between 1991 and 2010, however, the 
Supreme Court did not apply a strictly territorial version of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, as it had in Aramco, Smith, 
and Sale.  In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,106 decided just a 
week after Sale, the Court did not invoke the presumption to restrict 
the application of the Sherman Act.  The Court cited precedent 
specific to the Sherman Act holding that the Act “applies to foreign 
conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some 
substantial effect in the United States,”107  and concluded that the 
Sherman Act applied to foreign defendants’ actions in London 
reinsurance markets that affected (and were intended to affect) the 
U.S. insurance market.108  The Court left open whether U.S. courts 
should refrain from applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially, on 
the basis of principles of international comity, where there is a 
conflict between U.S. and foreign law (holding in Hartford Fire there 
was no need to do so because there was no conflict between British 
and U.S. antitrust law).109 
 
 103 Id. at 173-74. 
 104 Id. at 174, 188. 
 105 Id. at 188.  The Court did not rely on the assumption that Congress 
legislates with “domestic concerns in mind” because the INA explicitly addressed 
immigrants.  See id. at 206-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); William S. Dodge, 
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 
97 (1998). 
 106 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 107 Id. at 795-96 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
 108 Id. at 796-99.  
 109 Id. at 797-99.  The Court ruled there was no such conflict even though the 
London reinsurers claimed their conduct was consistent with British law because 
they could have complied with both British and U.S. law.  Id. at 798-99 (“No conflict 
exists, for these purposes, ‘where a person subject to regulation by two states can 
comply with the laws of both.’” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
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In F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran,110 the Supreme Court once 
more justified the presumption against extraterritoriality by 
reference to international law and comity, and applied a new and 
relatively ill-defined reasonableness test for construing statutes to 
comply with those principles.111  There, foreign plaintiffs alleged 
violations of the Sherman Act by conduct occurring almost entirely 
abroad, harming the plaintiffs outside of the United States, but also 
causing independent, additional harm to others within the United 
States.112  The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 
(FTAIA) specifically addressed the extraterritorial applicability of 
the Sherman Act and provided that the Act applied to conduct 
involving trade or commerce with foreign nations only “where 
(roughly speaking) that conduct significantly harms imports, 
domestic commerce, or American exporters.”113  The Court 
construed the FTAIA to exclude the foreign plaintiffs’ claims from 
the reach of the Sherman Act despite their allegation that the 
defendants’ foreign conduct had impacted domestic commerce, 
reasoning that the alleged domestic impact was independent of the 
foreign harm for which the plaintiffs sought redress.114 
In construing the FTAIA to exclude such claims, the Court cited 
principles of international law and comity (including the multifactor 
conflict-of-laws standard of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law), which it held Congress presumptively seeks to follow 
under the Charming Betsy canon.115  The Court distilled those 
principles into the mandate that statutes should ordinarily be 
construed to “avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign 
authority of other nations.”116  The Court then concluded that 
 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403, cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1987))).  The 
Court in Hartford Fire thus “embraced a highly restrictive vision of comity and 
interests balancing in general.”  Meyer, supra note 13, at 140; see also Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 820-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that “there is clearly a 
conflict in this litigation,” because “[w]here applicable foreign and domestic law 
provide different substantive rules of decision to govern the parties’ dispute, a 
conflict-of-laws analysis is necessary”). 
 110 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 111 Id. at 164-67. 
 112 Id. at 158-59, 164. 
 113 Id. at 158 (citing Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 
U.S.C. § 6a). 
 114 Id. at 164. 
 115 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 403 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987)). 
 116 Id. 
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applying U.S. antitrust law to foreign conduct and thereby 
interfering “with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate 
its own commercial affairs” is reasonable insofar as the law seeks to 
redress domestic injury.117  The Court held such interference would 
not be reasonable to redress only foreign harm, as the plaintiffs 
requested in Empagran, because “the justification for that 
interference seems insubstantial.”118 
1.4. 2010-2020: The Morrison Analysis 
By 2010, there was a general consensus that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality was incoherent and unpredictable, and 
that U.S. courts’ application of various different tests had led to 
doctrinal confusion.119  Over the course of the next decade, the 
Supreme Court sought to develop one generally applicable test for 
the presumption against extraterritoriality and to reconcile the 
varying rationales for the canon.120  That new test, a two-part 
analysis announced in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.121 and 
refined in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,122 marked a 
 
 117 Id. at 165. 
 118 Id. 
 119 John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 
SW. L. REV. 635, 636 (2011) (“[T]he confusion has worsened since the Court 
purported to adopt a strict version of the presumption in the early 1990s.”); 
Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1028 (“[T]he only thing courts and scholars seem to agree 
on is that the law in this area is a mess.”); Parrish, supra note 13, at 1460-61 
(“Condemned as incoherent and convoluted, a patchwork of incompatible rules 
presently governs legislative jurisdiction.”); Elhauge, supra note 13, at 2235 (The 
presumption against extraterritoriality “has been strongly critiqued both 
normatively and for its inconsistent application.”). 
 120 The Supreme Court acknowledged that there “are several reasons for” the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and sought to explain how the different 
rationales fit together.  See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 
2090, 2100 (2016).  The Court provided that the presumption is applied “across the 
board,” “regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American 
statute and a foreign law,” because the presumption serves not only “to avoid . . .  
international discord,” but also “reflects the more prosaic ‘commonsense notion 
that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.’”  Id. at 2100 
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); and then 
quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)).  The Court also held 
that while a risk of conflicts of law “is not a prerequisite for applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, where such a risk is evident, the need to 
enforce the presumption is at its apex.”  Id. at 2107 (citation omitted). 
 121 561 U.S. 247. 
 122 136 S. Ct. 2090. 
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significant change in U.S. courts’ interpretation of federal statutes’ 
extraterritorial reach and likely curtailed the number of federal 
statutes that will be applied extraterritorially.123 
In Morrison, the Supreme Court substantially altered earlier 
formulations of the presumption against extraterritoriality.  In an 
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court adopted a two-part 
analysis to determine (1) whether a statute applies extraterritorially 
and, if not, (2) whether application of the statute would be 
impermissibly extraterritorial pursuant to a new “focus” test.124  
Australian plaintiffs owned shares in an Australian company, 
National Australia Bank Limited (National), that were traded on an 
Australian stock exchange.125  Plaintiffs alleged that National, along 
with a U.S. company owned by National, engaged in deceptive 
behavior in Florida that impacted the value of their National shares 
in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act).126  At the first step of the analysis, the Court 
determined that § 10(b) did not apply extraterritorially because 
there was no “clear” or “affirmative indication in the Exchange Act” 
that it should apply extraterritorially.127 
The Supreme Court then adopted a “focus” test to determine 
whether applying § 10(b) to the facts presented in Morrison would 
involve an extraterritorial application of the legislation and thus be 
precluded by the presumption against extraterritoriality.  The Court 
reasoned that the presumption is “not self-evidently dispositive” in 
cases like Morrison, where material facts arise both within the United 
States and abroad.128  In these circumstances, ruling that a statute 
like § 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially sheds no light on 
whether its application is extraterritorial or domestic.  In order to 
 
 123 See Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 
94 B.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) (“Although the Supreme Court insists the presumption is 
not a clear statement rule, recent cases have approached this bright-line 
requirement.”). 
 124 561 U.S. at 266-70. 
 125 Id. at 251-52. 
 126 Id. at 251-53. 
 127 Id. at 265.  The Court rejected the suggestion that this standard amounted 
to a “clear statement rule” because “context can be consulted as well,” id., but that 
strict articulation of the presumption against extraterritoriality will permit few 
statutes to be applied abroad that do not explicitly provide for such application, Lea 
Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of 
American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 660 (2011). 
 128 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. 
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resolve that question, the Court examined whether the statute’s 
“focus,” or the “objects of [its] solicitude,” occurred abroad such that 
application of the statute in particular circumstances would qualify 
as extraterritorial.129  The Court held that the focus of § 10(b) was 
“upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States,” and 
“not upon the place where the deception originated.”130  The Court 
therefore concluded that applying § 10(b) to the deception in Florida 
would be impermissibly extraterritorial because the purchases and 
sales of the securities—the objects of the statute’s solicitude—
occurred on an Australian exchange. 
Morrison significantly changed the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in several ways.  First, the Supreme Court assessed 
separately whether § 10(b) of the Exchange Act applied 
extraterritorially and whether its application in Morrison was 
domestic or extraterritorial.  Prior cases had not explicitly bifurcated 
the analysis in that way, and had instead generally simply 
determined whether a statute applied to the facts presented.131  
Second, and relatedly, the “focus” test that the Court adopted at step 
two of the analysis in order to assess whether a statute is applied 
extraterritorially in a given case is new.132  That new “focus” test is a 
significant change to the presumption because it permits courts to 
define a statute’s application as territorial (and therefore 
permissible) or extraterritorial (and therefore frequently 
impermissible) by reference to the statutory “focus” discerned by 
the court.133  Third, the Court opined in dicta that the first step of the 
 
 129 Id. at 266-67. 
 130 Id. at 266. 
 131 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. 
Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004); see generally Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 664 (“The 
traditional one-step approach accommodated the same result without a second step 
. . . .”). 
 132 The Court in Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266, cited EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244 
(1991), which used the term “focus,” but did not apply a focus test.  In Aramco, the 
Court concluded that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act had “a purely domestic focus.”  
499 U.S. at 255.  The Court did not assess the regulatory focus of Title VII and then 
examine whether the object of that focus had occurred in the United States in order 
to determine whether application of the statute would be extraterritorial, as the 
Court did in Morrison.  See generally O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1059 (“[T]he 
Morrison Court chose to create its own ‘focus’ test, which had no precedential 
support.”); Knox, supra note 119, at 645. 
 133 The focus test permits courts to hold statutes inapplicable even where most 
of the cause of action occurs within the United States by holding that the statute’s 
focus is an element located outside of the United States.  Conversely, when a 
statute’s focus is a domestic element of a case, the focus analysis requires courts to 
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Morrison analysis determines only whether a statute applies 
extraterritorially or not.134  That strict dichotomy appears to 
preclude courts from determining at step one that a statute applies 
extraterritorially where conduct abroad has domestic effects,135 or 
the United States has the most significant relationship to the case 
pursuant to a multifactor test,136 as courts had previously done.   
The Supreme Court’s next decision applying the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,137 did 
not cite the “focus” test of Morrison.  It instead held that the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS) applies to “claims” that “touch and concern the 
territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force.”138  Nigerian 
nationals had filed suit against Dutch, British, and Nigerian 
companies under the ATS,139 which grants U.S. district courts 
“original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations.”140  Plaintiffs contended 
that the defendant companies “aided and abetted the Nigerian 
Government in committing violations of the law of nations in 
Nigeria” and that the ATS therefore gave the district court 
jurisdiction to hear the case and grant relief under international 
law.141 
The Court first concluded that it was constrained by the 
principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
exercising the jurisdiction conferred by the ATS to recognize as 
federal common law causes of action under international law.142  The 
substantive law applied pursuant to the ATS—international law that 
is applied as a matter of federal common law—is not statutory and 
is therefore not subject to limitation by a canon of statutory 
interpretation.  The Court acknowledged that it “typically appl[ies] 
the presumption to discern whether an Act of Congress regulating 
 
treat the statute as if it has no extraterritorial effect, even if a substantial part of the 
cause of action occurs abroad.  
 134 The Court explained that “[i]f § 10(b) did apply abroad, we would not need 
to determine which transnational frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them 
(barring some other limitation).”  561 U.S. at 267 n.9. 
 135 United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 136 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571. 
 137 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
 138 Id. at 124-25. 
 139 Id. at 111-12. 
 140 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 141 569 U.S. at 112-14. 
 142 Id. at 117, 124. 
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conduct applies abroad” and that the ATS is “strictly jurisdictional,” 
but nonetheless concluded that “[t]he principles underlying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality” “similarly constrain 
courts . . . exercising their power under the ATS.”143  The Court cited 
the purpose of the presumption against extraterritoriality to “help[] 
ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an 
interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences 
not clearly intended by the political branches.”144 
After examining the text, historical background, and 
contemporaneous application of the ATS, the Court concluded “that 
nothing in the statute rebuts” the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.145  The Court then asserted that in Kiobel “all the 
relevant conduct took place outside the United States,” and held that 
“even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United 
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.”146  The Court 
concluded that the defendants’ corporate presence in the United 
States did not suffice.147  Although the Court did not elaborate on 
what would satisfy the “touch and concern” test, its analysis seemed 
to permit applying the ATS abroad when a cause of action has 
significant connections to U.S. territory.  The Supreme Court did not 
mention Morrison’s focus test, which would instead require courts 
to apply the ATS only if the “focus” of the Act occurred in the United 
States, regardless whether the claims “touch and concern” U.S. 
territory.  Kiobel thus called into question whether and how the 
analysis set forth in Morrison would be applied outside the context 
of the Exchange Act. 
However, in two decisions on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality since Kiobel, the Supreme Court has twice applied 
the two-step Morrison analysis and has characterized Kiobel as 
 
 143 Id. at 115-17. 
 144 Id. at 116-17. 
 145 Id. at 124.  
 146 Id. at 124-25.  The Second Circuit ruled that the “touch and concern” part 
of the Supreme Court’s opinion was dicta because its holding that “all the relevant 
conduct took place outside the United States” was dispositive.  Balintulo v. Daimler 
AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190-91 & n.25 (2d Cir. 2013).  The Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Kiobel went on to say, however, that “mere corporate presence” does not suffice to 
“touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force.”  569 
U.S. at 124-25.  While the Court’s opinion is not entirely clear, the better reading is 
that the “touch and concern” test is not dicta because the Court applied it to the 
facts in Kiobel. 
 147 569 U.S. at 125. 
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applying that analysis as well.148  In RJR Nabisco, the Court applied 
Morrison’s “two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality 
issues”149 to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO).150  RICO enumerates certain state and federal crimes 
(predicates) that implicate RICO when they form “part of a ‘pattern 
of racketeering activity’—a series of related predicates that together 
demonstrate the existence or threat of continued criminal 
activity.”151  RICO imposes “prohibitions aimed at different ways in 
which a pattern of racketeering activity may be used to infiltrate, 
control, or operate” certain enterprises.152  RICO prescribes criminal 
liability for violations of these prohibitions and creates a private 
right of action on the same basis for “[a]ny person injured in his 
business or property.”153  At issue in RJR Nabisco were claims by the 
European Community and 26 of its Member States against RJR 
Nabisco and related entities pursuant to that private right of 
action.154 
The Court in RJR Nabisco held that the Morrison analysis applies 
“regardless of whether the statute in question regulates conduct, 
affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.”155  The Court therefore 
 
 148 In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016), the 
Supreme Court held that both Kiobel and Morrison “reflect a two-step framework 
for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.”  Id. at 2101.  The Court explained that in 
Kiobel it “did not need to determine, as [it] did in Morrison, the statute’s ‘focus’” 
because all relevant conduct occurred abroad.  Id. at 2100-01.  That mischaracterizes 
Kiobel.  Instead of applying the “focus” test, the Court in Kiobel held that claims 
under the ATS could “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application,” but 
that the Kiobel defendants’ corporate presence in the United States did not suffice.  
569 U.S. at 124-25.  A concurrence by two Justices in Kiobel had applied Morrison’s 
“focus” test to the ATS, but the majority did not adopt that reasoning or refer to the 
focus test.  Id. at 126-27 (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that Morrison’s “focus” 
test permits applying the ATS only where “the domestic conduct is sufficient to 
violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness 
and acceptance among civilized nations”). 
 149 136 S. Ct. at 2101.  The Supreme Court ruled that a court must first assess 
“whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted” by a clear 
indication that it applies abroad, and second “determine whether the case involves 
a domestic application of the statute . . . by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’”  Id. 
 150 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. 
 151 RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2096-97 (citing § 1961). 
 152 Id. at 2097 (citing § 1962). 
 153 Id. (citing §§ 1963(a), 1964(c)). 
 154 Id. at 2098. 
 155 Id. at 2101.  This requirement for Congress to “reiterate its extraterritorial 
intent in every provision of a statute, whether jurisdictional, substantive, or 
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applied the Morrison analysis separately to RICO’s substantive 
prohibitions and its private right of action.  The Court first held that 
RICO’s substantive prohibitions156 applied extraterritorially insofar 
as the statutes defining its predicate offenses “manifest[] an 
unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterritorially.”157  
The Court assumed that the alleged predicate offenses in RJR 
Nabisco were committed in the United States or “in violation of a 
predicate statute that applies extraterritorially” because RJR 
Nabisco did not challenge the Second Circuit’s ruling to that 
effect.158   
The Court next turned to RICO’s private right of action for 
“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of” RICO’s substantive prohibitions.159  The Court 
concluded that there was no clear indication that RICO’s private 
right of action applied extraterritorially, and that “[a] private RICO 
plaintiff therefore must allege and prove a domestic injury to its 
business or property.”160  The Court’s opinion did not address the 
separate steps of the Morrison analysis, but its holding implies that 
the “focus” of RICO’s private right of action is the plaintiff’s injury, 
so the injury must occur in the United States in order for the statute’s 
application to be domestic.  The Court ruled that the plaintiffs’ 
claims failed because the plaintiffs had “waiv[ed] their damages 
claims for domestic injuries.”161 
The Court’s next ruling on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality—WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.162—
appeared to retreat from the requirement announced in RJR Nabisco 
to apply the presumption separately to every statutory provision.  
The Court in WesternGeco applied the Morrison test to a provision of 
 
remedial,” is new, and it erects yet another hurdle to applying U.S. law abroad.  
Maggie Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 134, 
141-42 (2016). 
 156 The Court reserved judgment on the extraterritorial application of two of 
RICO’s substantive prohibitions, § 1962(a), (d), upon which the parties had not 
focused in their briefing.  136 S. Ct. at 2103.   
 157 136 S. Ct. at 2102.  The Court’s requirement for “unmistakable 
congressional intent” further increased the clarity with which statutes must indicate 
extraterritorial applicability from Morrison’s requirement for a “clear” or 
“affirmative indication.”  561 U.S. at 265. 
 158 136 S. Ct. at 2105. 
 159 Id. at 2106 (quoting § 1964(c)). 
 160 Id. at 2106-08. 
 161 Id. at 2111. 
 162 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018). 
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the Patent Act permitting patent owners to recover damages for the 
export of components of infringing products from the United 
States.163  Section 271(f)(2) of the Patent Act provided for liability for 
such infringement,164 while Section 284 authorized “damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement.”165  The question 
presented was whether these provisions allowed the plaintiff to 
recover lost profits incurred abroad.166 
The Court started with step two of the Morrison analysis to avoid 
“resolving difficult questions that do not change the outcome of the 
case, but could have far-reaching effects in future cases.”167  
Specifically, the Court declined to decide whether “the presumption 
against extraterritoriality should never apply to statutes . . . that 
merely provide a general damages remedy for conduct that 
Congress has declared unlawful.”168  The Court thus appeared to 
retreat from its unqualified ruling in RJR Nabisco that the 
presumption applies “regardless of whether the statute in question 
regulates conduct [or] affords relief.”169 
The Court then concluded that the focus of Section 284, which 
provides for “damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement,”170 was generally “the infringement” and in any 
particular case was determined by the provision imposing 
substantive liability for infringement.171  The Court explained that 
the focus of Section 271(f)(2) was on “the domestic act” of supplying 
infringing components “in or from the United States.”172  Recovery 
of foreign lost profits was therefore a permissible domestic 
application of Section 284, as long as the components at issue were 
supplied from the United States in violation of Section 271(f)(2).173   
 
 163 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 164 WesternGeco LLC, 138 S. Ct at 2134-35 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2)). 
 165 Id. at 2135 (quoting § 284). 
 166 Id. at 2134. 
 167 Id. at 2136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168 Id. 
 169 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). 
 170 WesternGeco LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 2137 (quoting § 284). 
 171 Id. at 2137-38. 
 172 Id. at 2138. 
 173 Id. at 2137-38. 
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1.5  The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in 2020 
Over the past decade (2010-2020), the Supreme Court has twice 
affirmed Morrison and has, it appears, firmly established its two-step 
analysis as the new presumption against extraterritoriality.  The 
Morrison analysis has nonetheless been the subject of substantial 
scholarly criticism,174 and it is not yet clear whether that analysis will 
or should govern in the long term.   
It appears clear that Morrison is difficult to administer coherently 
in practice.  For instance, as other critics have observed, the concept 
of a statute’s “focus” is undefined and ambiguous, and the Court’s 
instruction that “the object of the statute’s solicitude . . . can turn on 
the conduct, parties, or interests that it regulates or protects”175 
provides lower courts with little meaningful guidance in assessing 
which aspects of a statute should be deemed the “focus” for 
purposes of determining extraterritoriality.176  The “focus” test also 
gives rise to uncertainty in complex transnational disputes when 
courts seek to determine where the object of a statute’s solicitude is 
located in a particular case.177 
 
 174 See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 656 (concluding that Morrison’s 
“reworking of the presumption against extraterritorial application of American 
federal statutes is peddled as an antidote to federal judges run amok,” but that the 
“new approach provides considerably greater opportunity for creative judging 
than the method it replaces”); O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1060 (“Although 
Morrison’s focus test was designed to promote predictability and clear jurisdictional 
line-drawing, it is unlikely to serve those ends.”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining 
Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 342 (2014) (criticizing Morrison’s 
“focus” test as “entirely circular”). 
 175 WesternGeco LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 2138 (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). 
 176 See, e.g., O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1060 (“The test is difficult to apply 
because Congress does not normally identify a statutory focus.  Commentators are 
rightly concerned that it is therefore manipulable and subjective.” (footnote 
omitted)); Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1673, 1700 (2012) (“[E]ncouraging courts to . . . engage in a ‘focus’ analysis 
contributes little but obfuscation to the legislative jurisdiction analysis. . . .  
Presently, the test is so unformed that lower courts have almost no guidance on 
how to proceed in a principled way.”). 
 177 Aaron D. Simowitz, The Extraterritoriality Formalisms, 51 CONN. L. REV. 375, 
379 (2019); see Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 326 
(2015) (“Territoriality . . . depends on the ability to define the relevant ‘here’ and 
‘there,’ and it presumes that the ‘here’ and ‘there’ have normative significance.  The 
ease and speed with which data travels across borders, the seemingly arbitrary 
paths it takes, and the physical disconnect between where data is stored and where 
it is accessed critically test these foundational premises.”). 
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In addition, the Court has left unanswered two significant 
questions about when the Morrison analysis applies.  First, RJR 
Nabisco and WesternGeco do not provide lower courts clear direction 
as to which statutory provisions must separately be examined 
pursuant to the presumption against extraterritoriality.  In RJR 
Nabisco, the Court held that the presumption applies regardless 
whether a statute “regulates conduct [or] affords relief,”178 but two 
years later, in WesternGeco, the Court declined to decide whether the 
presumption “should never apply” to “general damages 
remed[ies].”179  Similarly, RJR Nabisco implied that the focus of 
RICO’s private right of action was on the plaintiff’s injury and was 
thus independent from the focus of the liability provisions,180 while 
WesternGeco assessed the focus of the Patent Act’s damages remedy 
by reference to the provisions establishing liability.181  The Court in 
WesternGeco sought to distinguish RJR Nabisco on the grounds that 
the private right of action at issue there involved “a substantive 
element of a cause of action, not a remedial damages provision,”182 
but the Court did not explain why that distinction is either relevant 
or decisive.  It also left open whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies separately to each element of a cause of 
action, to each element that is set forth in a separate statutory 
provision, or to some other subset of elements and provisions.183 
Second, although the Supreme Court held in RJR Nabisco that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies “regardless of 
whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or 
merely confers jurisdiction,”184 there is reason to doubt that the 
Court will apply the presumption separately to most jurisdictional 
 
 178 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).  
The Court therefore applied the presumption separately to RICO’s private cause of 
action and provisions imposing liability.  Id. at 2106. 
 179 138 S. Ct. at 2136. 
 180 136 S. Ct. at 2111. 
 181 138 S. Ct. at 2137-38. 
 182 Id. at 2138. 
 183 Cf. Carlos M. Vázquez, Out-Beale-Ing Beale, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 68, 70-71 
(2016) (observing that the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco “did not explain why it 
singled out the place of injury instead of [the] other elements of the cause of action” 
created by Section 1964(c) of RICO); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Building A Wall Against 
Private Actions for Overseas Injuries: The Impact of RJR Nabisco v. European 
Community, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 23-27 (2016). 
 184 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
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provisions.185  The Court in RJR Nabisco cited Kiobel to justify its 
conclusion that the presumption applies separately to related 
statutory provisions, reasoning that the Alien Tort Statute at issue in 
Kiobel was “strictly jurisdictional.”186  That citation was inapposite.  
Kiobel was an unusual case because there was no substantive U.S. 
statute to which the Court could have separately applied the 
presumption against extraterritoriality; the ATS grants courts 
jurisdiction to recognize as federal common law causes of action 
under international law.187  Kiobel therefore cannot stand for the 
proposition that other jurisdictional provisions must separately pass 
muster under the presumption against extraterritoriality.188  
In addition, as numerous commentators have explained, 
applying the presumption separately to jurisdictional provisions is 
“ill-advised” and “irreconcilable with the Court’s reasoning in other 
recent cases—including other portions of RJR Nabisco.”189  Congress 
generally does not specify extraterritorial applicability in 
jurisdictional statutes, and even in RJR Nabisco the Court did not 
separately apply the presumption to the general federal question 
statute.190 
2. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY IS 
INCOMPATIBLE WITH TEXTUALISM 
With this background on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality we can assess whether the canon complies with 
textualist tenets.  Textualism instructs courts to give effect to the 
statutory text, read in context and against the remainder of the 
corpus juris.  Textualists therefore embrace linguistic canons that 
help discern the meaning of statutory text.  Substantive canons that 
 
 185 William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Still Does Not 
Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (July 1, 2016), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/01/32658/ [https://perma.cc/5XJH-ZTEL]. 
 186 136 S. Ct. at 2106 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 
(2013)). 
 187 569 U.S. at 116.  The Court acknowledged that it “typically appl[ies] the 
presumption to discern whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct applies 
abroad,” and concluded that the “principles underlying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality” “similarly constrain . . . courts exercising their power under the 
ATS” to recognize causes of action.  Id. at 116-17.  
 188 Dodge, supra note 185.   
 189 Gardner, supra note 155, at 142; see also Dodge, supra note 185. 
 190 Dodge, supra note 185 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/1
2020] Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 575 
instruct courts to displace the best reading of a statute on the basis 
of an extrinsic policy are, by contrast, contrary to the textualist 
principle “that a faithful agent must adhere to the product of the 
legislative process.”191  Textualists therefore endorse only the subset 
of such substantive canons that have been applied so consistently 
that they form part of the background against which Congress 
legislates.  Substantive canons that function only as tiebreakers to 
help courts choose among equally plausible interpretations are also 
permissible under textualism because they do not supplant 
Congress’s instructions. 
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a substantive 
canon because, generally speaking, it instructs courts to further the 
policy of limiting U.S. law to U.S. territory.  The presumption may 
therefore be applied to displace the best reading of statutory text 
consistently with textualism only if the presumption forms part of 
the longstanding background conventions against which Congress 
legislates.  Despite the presumption’s roots in the early nineteenth 
century, U.S. courts’ application of the canon has varied so 
frequently and dramatically that no single doctrinal standard forms 
part of the background against which Congress legislates.  Courts’ 
consistent reliance on the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
one form or another to restrict the applicability of universally 
worded statutes (referring to “any seaman,”192 for example) has, 
however, given rise to a narrower background convention that 
complies with textualist tenets:  Such universally worded statutes 
that contain no express territorial limitations should not be 
construed to apply throughout the world.  As a consequence, courts 
may construe such statutes to have territorial limits consistently 
with textualism; importantly, however, in discerning what these 
territorial limits are, textualism requires one uniformly-applied test, 
which has thus far been badly lacking. 
 
 191 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 124. 
 192 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1953) (citing Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§ 688 (1952) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30104)). 
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2.1. Textualism and Canons of Statutory Interpretation 
Modern textualism was developed in the late twentieth century, 
in large part by Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook.193  Most 
fundamentally, textualism requires judges to give effect to the 
statutory text enacted by the legislature.194  Textualists conceive of 
U.S. courts as the “faithful agents” of Congress,195 and maintain that 
the best way for judges to respect legislative supremacy is to focus 
on the meaning of the statutory text in context.196  Textualism 
maintains that “courts must enforce a clearly worded statutory text 
even when its semantic import does not fully capture the statute’s 
apparent purpose,”197 and reject the notion that courts should 
separately seek to divine and implement Congress’s “true 
intentions.”198 
Textualists ascribe primary importance to the statutory text for 
two main reasons.  First, only statutes—“not legislative history, not 
legislative purpose, not legislative ‘intent’—have gone through the 
constitutionally specified procedures for the enactment of law.”199  
Second, textualists maintain that “multi-member legislatures do not 
have an actual but unexpressed ‘intent’ on any materially contested 
interpretive point.”200  Specifically, textualists contend that 
 
 193 John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419-
20 (2005) [hereinafter Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent]; John F. Manning, 
What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 73 (2006) 
[hereinafter Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists].  Textualism has 
been evolving since its inception in the 1980s.  See generally John F. Manning, Second-
Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1292 (2010) [hereinafter Manning, 
Second-Generation].  I focus on the currently prevalent “second-generation” 
textualism.  Id. at 1289-90. 
 194 Manning, supra note 4, at 2390. 
 195 Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 424, 430. 
 196 Manning, supra note 4, at 2456-58. 
 197 Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 193, at 1304.  Textualism was 
conceived in part as a reaction to and refutation of purposivism.  See Manning, What 
Divides Textualists From Purposivists, supra note 193, at 71-73; Manning, Second-
Generation, supra note 193, at 1291-92.  Purposivists traditionally maintained that 
judges should discern and implement Congress’s true intentions, including by 
reference to legislative history, even if the statutory text fails to capture or even 
contradicts that true intent.  See Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists, 
supra note 193, at 71-72. 
 198 Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 420-21. 
 199 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 405, 416 (1989). 
 200 Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 420. 
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legislators instead have individual “desires, priorities, and 
preferences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to 
aggregate.”201  Textualists also claim “that the (often unseen) 
complexities of the legislative process make it meaningless to speak 
of ‘legislative intent’ as distinct from the meaning conveyed by a 
clearly expressed statutory command.”202  Finally, textualists 
maintain that legislation is “often the product of compromise” so 
that “judges cannot reliably use idealized background legislative 
intent as a ground for deviating from a clear and specific statute.”203 
Textualism instead instructs judges to determine “how ‘a skilled, 
objectively reasonable user of words’ would have understood the 
statutory text.”204  Rather than looking for actual congressional 
intent, textualists “focus primarily on ‘“objectified” intent—the 
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the 
law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.’”205  
Textualists thus do not limit statutory interpretation to the “four 
corners” of a statute, and they “believe that statutory language, like 
all language, conveys meaning only because a linguistic community 
attaches common understandings to words and phrases, and relies 
on shared conventions for deciphering those words and phrases in 
particular contexts.”206  Textualists accordingly consult dictionaries 
and “pay attention to the glosses often put on language (even in 
ordinary usage) [and] the specialized connotations of established 
terms of art.”207 
Textualists also apply canons of statutory interpretation.208  
Canons are generally divided into linguistic and substantive 
 
 201 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48 
(1983).   
 202 Manning, supra note 4, at 2390. 
 203 Id. at 2410; see also Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 193, at 1304 
(Textualists recognize that “legislation often represents unknowable compromise, 
that compromise often requires legislators to embrace means that do not fully 
effectuate the ends that inspired the law’s enactment, and that judges who pursue 
a statute’s background purposes at the expense of its implemental detail therefore 
risk undermining rather than furthering the legislative design.”). 
 204 Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 434 (quoting 
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988)). 
 205 Manning, supra note 5, at 16 (quoting SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17). 
 206 Id. at 108-09. 
 207 Id. at 109-10. 
 208 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 121.  Canons are rules of thumb or 
“interpretive principle[s] that judges have customarily used” to aid them in 
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canons,209 although commentators have adopted different terms for 
grouping the canons.210  Textualists embrace linguistic canons, 
which set forth rules on how language in general and statutes in 
particular communicate meaning, and often deal with grammar or 
statutory structure.211  For instance, the expressio unius canon 
provides that “[t]he expression of one thing” in a statutory provision 
“implies the exclusion of others.”212  Textualists favor the use of 
linguistic canons because they “deem it essential to foster clear and 
predictable linguistic and syntactic rules to permit legislators and 
interpreters to decode enacted texts.”213  Linguistic canons align 
with textualists’ focus on the statutory text in context because their 
“very purpose is to decipher the legislature’s intent.”214 
Substantive canons instruct courts to construe statutes to further 
policies extrinsic to the statute at issue.215  Some substantive canons 
“serve simply as tie breakers between two equally plausible 
interpretations of a statute,” while others require courts to “forgo 
the most plausible interpretation of a statute in favor of one in better 
accord with some policy objective.”216  Textualist judges often apply 
substantive canons,217 but they are difficult to reconcile with 
 
interpreting and applying statutes.  Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons 
of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and 
Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 543 (1997-1998). 
 209 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 117 (Canons are “traditionally classified as 
either linguistic or substantive.”). 
 210 See id. at 117 n.27; Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? 
Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) 
(distinguishing between “descriptive” and “normative” canons). 
 211 See Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 117, 121; ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW 51 (2012) (“In whatever age or culture, human intelligence 
follows certain principles of expression that are as universal as principles of 
logic. . . . [These canons] are not ‘rules’ of interpretation in any strict sense but 
presumptions about what an intelligently produced text conveys.”). 
 212 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 211, at 107-11.  
 213 John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 283, 
291-92 (2002). 
 214 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 117. 
 215 Id. at 117-18; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 593, 595-96 (1992). 
 216 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 117-18. 
 217 Id. at 122-23 (citing Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 
340, 345-46 (1998) (Thomas, J.), and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 
224, 270 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting), for the constitutional avoidance canon; citing 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-21 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting), 
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textualism unless they function merely as tiebreakers that resolve 
truly ambiguous statutory text.218  Substantive canons that instruct 
courts to depart from the best reading of the statutory text in context 
are contrary to “the usual textualist practice of interpreting a statute 
as it is most likely to be understood by a skilled user of the language” 
and “the more fundamental textualist insistence that a faithful agent 
must adhere to the product of the legislative process, not strain its 
language to account for abstract intention or commonly held social 
values.”219  Indeed, Justice Scalia questioned “where the courts get 
the authority to impose” substantive canons, and “doubt[ed]” that 
courts can “really just decree that [they] will interpret the laws that 
Congress passes to mean less or more than what they fairly say.”220  
Textualists contend that some substantive canons are 
nonetheless compatible with their approach to statutory 
interpretation because they have become so ingrained that they 
constitute part of the background against which Congress 
legislates.221  According to Justice Scalia, once canons “have been 
long indulged, they acquire a sort of prescriptive validity, since the 
legislature presumably has them in mind when it chooses its 
 
for the Charming Betsy canon; citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. 
Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946 (1997) (Thomas, J.), and Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 
U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring), for the presumption against retroactivity; 
citing Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 399 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and 
EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment), for the presumption against extraterritoriality; citing 
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia, J.), for the rule of lenity).  See 
also Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the 
Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 762 (2013) (“But, in practice, even though 
[Justice Scalia] is one of the most vocal opponents of federal common law making, 
he is one of the most prolific users of both textual and policy canons.”). 
 218 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 123-24. 
 219 Id. at 124.  See also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown 
Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1542-43 (1998) (“But the problem is that the 
substantive, dice-loading canons risk the normative appeal of the new textualism: 
they are, as Scalia says, potentially undemocratic because they are judge-made 
presumptions and rules that Congress has a hard time trumping . . . and [they are] 
potentially destabilizing if judges succumb to the temptation of creating new 
canons or adjusting old ones to their changing tastes.”). 
 220 SCALIA, supra note 5, at 28-29; see also Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of 
Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 582 (1990) (“I should think 
that the effort, with respect to any statute, should be neither liberally to expand nor 
strictly to constrict its meaning, but rather to get the meaning precisely right.”). 
 221 See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 29 (“The rule of lenity is almost as old as the 
common law itself, so I suppose that [it] is validated by sheer antiquity.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
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language.”222  Dean John Manning explains that “[t]his interpretive 
approach follows from the textualists’ conception of meaning: . . . 
the meaning of a text depends on the shared background 
conventions of the relevant linguistic community,” so that courts 
construing statutes “should consult the assumptions of a reasonable 
person conversant with legal conventions.”223  Because this 
justification depends upon canons’ longstanding application, 
textualists “must largely accept the world as they find it, treating the 
existing set of background conventions as a closed set.”224 
 
 222 Scalia, supra note 220, at 583.  Similarly, Dean John Manning concludes that 
textualists employ canons of statutory construction, “including some substantive 
(policy-oriented) canons that have come to be accepted as background assumptions 
by virtue of longstanding prescription.”  Manning, What Divides Textualists From 
Purposivists, supra note 193, at 82. 
 223 Manning, supra note 4, at 2467.  Even when the substantive canons are 
applied so consistently that they attain the status of “shared background 
conventions,” they do not become linguistic conventions in the sense that they form 
part of the way the legal community understands language.  Many lawyers are 
likely at best superficially familiar with the most prominent substantive canons, 
and would need to consult treatises or precedent in order to determine how a 
specific substantive canon outside their regular practice applies.  Distinguishing 
this type of shared substantive framework from linguistic conventions does not 
diminish the textualist claim that those substantive canons form part of the shared 
background between Congress and legal practitioners. 
 224 Id. at 2474 (emphasis added).  See also Eskridge, supra note 219, at 1543 
(examining the compatibility of substantive canons with textualism and concluding 
that “[t]he longstanding substantive canons can be viewed as conventions 
underlying congressional deliberations,” but identifying problems with this view 
when the Supreme Court modifies those canons or applies them inconsistently).  I 
will treat textualists’ acceptance of a “closed set” of longstanding and consistently 
applied substantive canons as a valid textualist tenet for purposes of this paper, but 
the matter is not entirely uncontroversial.  For instance, Judge Barrett contends that 
the concept of a “closed set” cannot be justified on the basis that judicial 
development of substantive background norms is “a legitimate part of a legal 
system’s evolution” but “dissipates once the legal system is mature.”  Coney 
Barrett, supra note 6, at 161.  Furthermore, an empirical study by Professors Abbe 
Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman indicates that the congressional staffers who 
generally draft legislation may be unaware of some commonly-applied canons.  
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 901, 945-47 (2013).  Judge Barrett counters that linguistic canons at least are 
compatible with textualism insofar as they track common usage, regardless 
whether “Congress rejects them” because “courts are entitled to adopt a default 
presumption that Congress legislates in the language of the ordinary reader.”  Amy 
Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193, 2204-05 
(2017). 
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2.2. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Is a Substantive 
Canon 
The presumption against extraterritoriality instructs courts to 
construe statutes’ extraterritorial reach by reference to principles 
and policies that are extrinsic to the statute at issue.  Most 
fundamentally, the canon has generally required courts to interpret 
statutes to apply only within U.S. territory.225  More specifically, 
courts applying the presumption against extraterritoriality have 
construed statutes’ geographic scope in conformity with public 
international law governing prescriptive jurisdiction,226 conflict of 
laws principles,227 international comity principles,228 an assumed 
congressional focus on domestic issues,229 and separation of powers 
concerns.230  Each of these iterations of the presumption requires 
courts to construe statutes according to an extra-statutory policy—
ranging from compliance with international law or comity to the 
notion that U.S. law should presumptively not apply beyond U.S. 
borders—and none are focused on deciphering the statutory text by 
reference to rules about grammar or statutory structure.  The 
presumption against extraterritoriality is therefore fairly clearly a 
substantive canon.231 
Courts and commentators have at times sought to frame the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as linguistic, as descriptive 
of the way in which Congress legislates, or as a constitutionally 
 
 225 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007) (describing the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as “[t]he presumption that United States law 
governs domestically but does not rule the world”). 
 226 See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824); Am. Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (relying partly on public international law 
conceptions of national sovereignty in addition to conflict of laws principles); F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (holding that U.S. 
law is construed to comport with customary international law, which the Court 
“must assume[] Congress ordinarily seeks to follow”). 
 227 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953); Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 228 See, e.g., Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-67 (applying “principles of prescriptive 
comity”). 
 229 See, e.g., EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 230 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-16 (2013) (“For 
us to run interference in . . . a delicate field of international relations there must be 
present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 
(1957))). 
 231 See Sunstein, supra note 199, at 460. 
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inspired clear statement rule, but these labels are inapposite.  In 
United States v. Delgado-Garcia,232 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit described the presumption against extraterritoriality as 
a “linguistic convention.”233  The court held that the presumption 
“embodies sensible contextual linguistic reasons for reading the plain 
texts of domestic statutes not to apply everywhere in the world.”234  
The court reasoned that “[b]ecause Congress’s primary arena of 
sovereignty is the territorial United States, it makes sense to 
presume, absent other evidence, that its commands linguistically 
apply only there.”235 
This characterization of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as linguistic is unpersuasive.  The presumption 
instructs courts to implement substantive policies and principles in 
construing statutes to apply (generally speaking) only within U.S. 
borders, and it is therefore substantive and not linguistic.236  There 
is also no indication that English speakers in the United States 
assume that all words or proscriptions refer only to things within 
U.S. borders,237 or understand all statutory language to apply only 
within U.S. borders.238  Even for the linguistic community of those 
who draft and interpret U.S. law, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is too complex and too dependent upon concepts 
of law and territorial sovereignty to plausibly be said to form part of 
 
 232 374 F.3d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 233 Id. at 1345. 
 234 Id. at 1344 (emphasis added). 
 235 Id. (emphasis added). 
 236 See supra notes 215-16, 225-31 and accompanying text.  See also Kramer, 
supra note 12, at 184 (“The Court’s decision [in Aramco] thus reflects a normative 
judgment that it is preferable to restrict American law.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 682 
(1999) (“Most of the substantive canons are hard if not impossible to defend on 
ordinary-use-of-language or this-is-what-the-legislature-would-want grounds.”). 
 237 For instance, if a doctor instructed a patient not to run marathons, the 
patient would almost certainly understand that the prohibition applies both inside 
and outside U.S. borders. 
 238 Any assumptions as to whether U.S. law applies abroad are based on 
substantive considerations that are informed by the kind of legislation at issue.  For 
instance, English speakers in the United States would likely not assume that federal 
legislation prohibiting the provision of material assistance to foreign terrorist 
groups, governing the conduct of U.S. soldiers, prohibiting the payment of bribes 
to foreign officials, or prohibiting the importation of illicit drugs or firearms into 
the United States applies only within U.S. borders.  By contrast, English speakers in 
the United States may well assume that federal law governing different kinds of 
behavior, such as the possession of controlled substances, sale of pornography, and 
possession of firearms, would not apply to them overseas. 
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a shared understanding about the meaning of statutory text.  The 
Morrison analysis, for example, requires interpreters of statutory text 
to apply a two-part test and consult the Court’s relevant precedent; 
similarly, the standards in Lauritzen, Timberlane, and Section 403 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law require application of 
a multi-factor balancing test.  Neither these nor other iterations of 
the presumption address or explain how Congress ordinarily uses 
language. 
Incorrectly classifying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as linguistic has serious consequences.  As Judge 
Coney Barrett warned, “canons that ostensibly advance substantive 
values are sometimes rationalized as functionally linguistic,” 
because “linguistic canons, which pose no challenge to legislative 
supremacy, are preferable to substantive canons, which do.”239  
Defining the presumption against extraterritoriality as linguistic 
automatically validates the canon and obviates the need to assess 
whether the substantive justifications that courts and commentators 
have offered for the canon are valid. 
The Supreme Court has at times framed the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as descriptive of the way Congress legislates, but 
that is also not a sound characterization or persuasive justification 
of the canon.  In Morrison, for example, the Court held that the 
presumption “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily 
legislates with respect to domestic . . . matters.”240  That assertion 
about Congress’s usual focus is an unproven empirical assumption.  
Many statutes are silent as to their extraterritorial reach or contain 
no territorial limitations,241 and it is not clear that Congress 
ordinarily considers or forms a view as to extraterritoriality.242  The 
assumption that Congress “is primarily concerned with domestic 
 
 239 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 120. 
 240 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).  Professor 
Caleb Nelson has also described the presumption against extraterritoriality as a 
canon that “reflect[s] observations about Congress’s own habits.”  Caleb Nelson, 
What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 390 (2005). 
 241 See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 13, at 184-86 (providing extensive list of criminal 
laws without any territorial limitation); Born, supra note 21, at 7 (“In the 
overwhelming majority of cases . . . federal statutes are couched in the most general 
terms and suggest no meaningful geographic limits.”). 
 242 See Clopton, supra note 123, at 13 (concluding that “[i]n many 
circumstances, Congress may be agnostic”); Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the 
Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392, 393 (1980) (providing that “in the vast 
majority of cases, legislatures have no actual intent on territorial reach”). 
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conditions”243 may nonetheless be reasonable, but this formulation 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality as merely descriptive 
risks confusing courts’ enforcement of a substantive policy against 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law for empirical evidence of 
Congress’s intent.244  In addition, the assumption that Congress 
“primarily” legislates with respect to domestic matters provides 
little guidance to courts assessing whether a statute also applies to 
non-domestic, as well as domestic, matters or applies to a cause of 
action with some domestic and some extraterritorial elements.  
There are “many different ways to conceptualize domestic 
concern”—including a concern for domestic conduct, for 
extraterritorial conduct with domestic effects, and for extraterritorial 
conduct by U.S. nationals—and “different conceptions might make 
more sense for different types of legislation.”245  
The presumption against extraterritoriality is also not a 
constitutionally inspired clear statement rule despite the Supreme 
Court’s occasional reference to separation of powers concerns to 
justify the canon.  Constitutionally inspired clear statement rules are 
a subset of substantive canons that require Congress to state clearly 
that a statute impinges on a “constitutionally inspired value.”246  The 
Supreme Court has at times held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality preserves the constitutional separation of powers 
because it prevents courts from making decisions with potential 
foreign policy consequences, which the Constitution entrusts to the 
 
 243 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255. 
 244 See EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (ruling that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is “a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional 
intent may be ascertained”); Kramer, supra note 12, at 184 (“[H]aving decided which 
course of action is generally preferable, courts assume that this is what ‘reasonable’ 
lawmakers would want.”). 
 245 See Clopton, supra note 123, at 15. 
 246 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 399, 406-07 (2010).  For example, courts have required Congress to “make its 
intention . . . unmistakably clear in the language of the statute” where “Congress 
intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal 
Government.” Id. at 407-10 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).  
There is debate about whether constitutionally inspired clear statement rules are 
compatible with textualism.  See, e.g., id. at 403-05 (arguing that constitutionally 
inspired clear statement rules “impose something of a clarity tax upon legislative 
proceedings in particular areas” and impermissibly seek to enforce constitutional 
values in the abstract); Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 111 (contending that “to the 
extent a canon is constitutionally inspired, its application does not necessarily 
conflict with the structural norms that constrain judges from engaging in broad, 
equitable interpretation”). 
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political branches and which they are better suited to make.247  In 
Kiobel, for instance, the Supreme Court held that the presumption 
“helps ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an 
interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences 
not clearly intended by the political branches.”248  The Court 
explained that Congress alone “has the facilities necessary to make 
fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of 
international discord are so evident and retaliative action so 
certain.”249 
The presumption against extraterritoriality nonetheless does not 
qualify as a constitutionally inspired clear statement rule for two 
reasons.  First, the separation of powers rationale applies in only a 
fraction of the cases involving the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.  The Supreme Court often does not invoke the 
constitutional rationale for the presumption.250  In addition, while a 
separation of powers rationale might arguably support a strictly 
territorial version of the canon, it is difficult to see how that rationale 
applies to various other iterations of the presumption.  For example, 
the separation of powers rationale does not seem to support, and 
instead weighs against, courts assessing whether the application of 
U.S. law would result in “unreasonable interference with the 
sovereign authority of other nations,”251 as the Supreme Court did 
 
 247 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-16 (2013); Sale 
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (The “presumption has special 
force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve 
foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.”); 
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 
(1963) (concluding that in the present “highly charged international 
circumstances,” “there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress 
clearly expressed” “for us to sanction the exercise of local sovereignty . . . in this 
delicate field of international relations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 248 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116. 
 249 Id. (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 
(1957)); see also Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 258 (emphasizing “the need to make a clear 
statement that a statute applies overseas” to prevent “unintended clashes between 
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord”). 
 250 See generally Clopton, supra note 123, at 16.  The primary rationales for the 
presumption against extraterritoriality over the past ten years instead seem to be 
the “basic premise of our legal system that, in general, ‘United States law governs 
domestically but does not rule the world,’” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European 
Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 
550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)), and Congress’s presumed focus on domestic concerns, 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (holding that the 
territoriality presumption “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily 
legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters”). 
 251 F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). 
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in Empagran.  Likewise, balancing tests that require courts to weigh 
the significance of factors connecting the “transaction regulated and 
the national interest served by the assertion of authority”252 directly 
involve courts in the type of foreign policy assessments that the 
separation of powers rationale purportedly seeks to avoid.253  The 
Morrison focus test also cannot be justified by reference to the 
separation of powers because it requires courts to apply statutes to 
extraterritorial conduct as long as the statute’s “focus” is domestic, 
regardless of the potential for “foreign policy consequences not 
clearly intended by the political branches.”254 
Second, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not 
qualify as a constitutionally inspired clear statement rule because it 
raises as many separation of powers concerns as it allays.  A default 
judgment against statutes’ application beyond U.S. borders is itself 
a significant foreign policy judgment with potential consequences 
for the United States’ foreign policy.  In addition, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality impinges on the separation of powers by 
restricting Congress’s power to legislate under Article I of the 
Constitution.255  That is especially true where courts set a high bar 
for Congress to displace the presumption, as the Supreme Court has 
done pursuant to the Morrison analysis, requiring that a statute 
“manifest[] an unmistakable congressional intent to apply 
extraterritorially”256 or a “clear” or “affirmative indication” to that 
effect.257 
 
 252 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953). 
 253 In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), the Court 
rejected the notion that it should balance foreign and domestic contacts to 
determine whether U.S. law applied to a foreign-flag ship.  The Court refused to 
apply U.S. law extraterritorially absent clearly expressed congressional intent to the 
contrary, in part because the “purely ad hoc weighing of contacts” would 
“inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs.”  Id. at 19. 
 254 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116; see Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1045-46. 
 255 See generally Clopton, supra note 123, at 16-17.  The presumption against 
extraterritoriality, formulated as a constitutionally inspired clear statement rule, 
thus raises the same concerns as other clear statement rules: By requiring Congress 
to formulate legislation more clearly than usual if it impedes a constitutionally 
inspired value protected by a clear statement rule, courts “increase[] the expense of 
enacting legislation” and “effectively impose[] a judicial tax upon legislation that 
seeks to achieve a constitutionally disfavored result.”  See Manning, supra note 246, 
at 425. 
 256 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016). 
 257 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010). 
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2.3. Textualism and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Because the presumption against extraterritoriality is a 
substantive canon, it is presumptively incompatible with textualism 
unless it is used only to choose among equally plausible 
interpretations of a statute.258  Insofar as the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is applied to displace the most natural reading of 
statutory text, it accords with textualism only if its application is so 
longstanding and consistent that it forms part of the legal 
background against which Congress legislates. 
Courts’ variable and inconsistent application of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality since its inception in the early nineteenth 
century precludes it from forming part of the “closed set” of 
substantive canons that comply with textualism.  Specifically, U.S. 
courts have interpreted the presumption to require strictly territorial 
construction of statutes,259 to permit statutes to apply to 
extraterritorial conduct when its effects are felt within U.S. 
territory,260 to mandate a multi-factor conflict of laws analysis for 
determining whether applying U.S. law would be reasonable,261 and 
to permit the extraterritorial application of U.S. law where a statute’s 
focus occurred in the United States.262  Similarly, U.S. courts have 
justified the presumption with numerous competing, sometimes 
inconsistent, rationales:  The Supreme Court has at different times 
asserted that Congress presumably intends for statutes not to violate 
international law,263 and that Congress is assumed to legislate with 
domestic concerns in mind.264  The Court has also held both that 
separation of powers concerns justify applying the presumption to 
prevent courts from engaging in foreign policy decision-making,265 
and that the presumption requires courts to engage in multi-factor 
 
 258 See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
 259 See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); Foley 
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
 260 See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620-24 (1927); United States v. 
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 261 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953); Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 262 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266-70. 
 263 F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). 
 264 Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285. 
 265 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115-16 (2013).  
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balancing tests that inevitably involve foreign policy 
considerations.266 
There is accordingly no single presumption against 
extraterritoriality that can form part of the “closed set” of 
substantive canons that are compatible with textualism by virtue of 
their longstanding and consistent application.267  None of the 
numerous different doctrinal tests has been applied uniformly 
enough to form part of the “shared background conventions” of 
those who draft and interpret statutes.268  Judges seeking to comply 
with textualism should therefore no longer apply the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to displace the most natural reading of 
statutory text.269  Specifically, textualist judges should assess a 
statute’s extraterritorial reach by reference to ordinary textualist 
tools of statutory interpretation.  These include determining the 
statute’s objectified intent, or “the intent that a reasonable person 
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the 
remainder of the corpus juris,”270 and referring to applicable 
linguistic canons and the “closed set” of longstanding substantive 
canons.271  If a textualist judge can thereby determine a statute’s 
extraterritorial reach—or the one most plausible interpretation of its 
extraterritorial reach where there are several possible readings—
then he or she should not invoke the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to reach a different result. 
The two-step analysis that the Supreme Court announced in 
Morrison in 2010 and has since developed in RJR Nabisco and 
WesternGeco was originally formulated by Justice Scalia, among the 
most committed proponents of textualism, but that analysis is 
particularly problematic for textualists.  The Court’s turn towards a 
particularly strict presumption against extraterritoriality that 
requires statutes to “manifest[] an unmistakable congressional 
 
 266 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 581-93. 
 267 Manning, supra note 4, at 2474. 
 268 Id. at 2467. 
 269 Dean Manning has also noted that insofar as longstanding substantive 
canons are compatible with textualism because “the legislature presumably has 
them in mind when it chooses its language,” “textualists should presumably 
attempt to identify and apply the conventions in effect at the time of a statute’s 
enactment.”  Id. at 2474 n.318.  This type of exercise would be patently absurd for 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, given the number of doctrinal tests that 
have been applied over the past two centuries and the courts’ unpredictable 
selection among them. 
 270 Manning, supra note 5, at 16. 
 271 See supra notes 204-24 and accompanying text. 
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intent to apply extraterritorially,”272 or a “clear” or “affirmative 
indication” to that effect,273 is contrary to textualist tenets because it 
displaces the most plausible reading of statutory text unless 
Congress legislates with heightened clarity.274  In addition, 
Morrison’s “focus” test is wholly new in several important 
respects,275 and thus directly contradicts textualists’ insistence that 
canons may displace the best interpretation of the statutory text only 
where they have been applied so consistently as to form part of a 
“closed set” of background conventions.276  The Morrison analysis 
therefore also conflicts with textualists’ commitment to consistency 
more generally,277 realizing warnings that a textualist judge who 
develops the canons “common law style” “becomes just as 
unpredictable as, and may even come to resemble, her 
doppelganger the willful judge.”278 
Even though none of the doctrinal tests applied pursuant to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality form part of the “closed set” 
of longstanding substantive canons, U.S. courts’ fairly consistent 
resort to various iterations of the canon in order to limit statutes that 
are worded universally and contain no explicit territorial restrictions 
nonetheless gives rise to a legitimate, albeit more narrow, 
background convention.  The most straightforward interpretation of 
 
 272 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016). 
 273 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010). 
 274 See Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 657 (“In place of a less-than-perfect 
evidentiary showing about Congressional intentions, Morrison substitutes a purely 
judicial construct, ‘focus,’ that makes no pretense at all of reflecting what Congress 
wanted.  So much for legislative supremacy.” (footnote omitted)); Gardner, supra 
note 155, at 134 (“The presumption against extraterritoriality has become a means 
for judges (particularly Justices) to override Congress in defining the proper scope 
of litigation in U.S. courts.”). 
 275 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
 276 Manning, supra note 4, at 2474. 
 277 Scalia, supra note 220, at 588 (“Consistency is the very foundation of the 
rule of law.”). 
 278 Eskridge, supra note 219, at 1545-46; see also Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the 
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 199, 212 (1999) (“The creation of new canons and the manipulation of 
old ones provide the formalist with a safety valve—a device for avoiding textual 
readings that she cannot abide.  When this proclivity to make law through canonical 
technique is combined with the neat trick of selectively relying upon some 
ambiguity to free the court to consider other factors, one must wonder whether the 
new formalism is, in practice, very formalistic at all.”). 
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statutes that refer to “any seaman,”279 “any court,”280 or “every 
contract”281 seems to be that they apply universally, to every 
seaman, court, and contract in the world.  But the Supreme Court 
has consistently interpreted those and other universally worded 
statutes to apply only within the United States, or only in cases with 
significant connections to the United States.282  A canon of statutory 
interpretation providing that such universal language does not 
speak to the issue of extraterritorial applicability and requires the 
judicial imposition of some territorial limitations has thus been 
applied consistently for a sufficient time to form part of the 
background against which Congress legislates.  Courts may read 
territorial limitations into such statutes consistently with textualism, 
but in formulating those limits textualism should be understood to 
require that they adopt one test and apply it uniformly in order to 
further the textualist tenet that statutes should be interpreted 
predictably and consistently.283 
 
 279 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1953) (quoting Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C. § 688 (1952) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30104)). 
 280 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1)). 
 281 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (quoting Eight Hour Law, 
Pub. L. No. 199, § 1, 37 Stat. 137, 137 (1912) (repealed 1962)). 
 282 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 576-77, 592-93 (ruling that the Jones Act did not apply 
to a Danish sailor who had been hired by a Danish citizen to work aboard a Danish 
ship while temporarily in the United States, and was allegedly injured while aboard 
that ship in a Cuban harbor); Small, 544 U.S. at 394 (concluding “that the phrase 
‘convicted in any court’ refers only to domestic courts, not to foreign courts”); Foley 
Bros., 336 U.S. at 290-91 (ruling that “the Eight Hour Law is inapplicable to a 
contract for the construction of public works in a foreign country over which the 
United States has no direct legislative control”); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
362, 370 (1824) (concluding that “general and comprehensive” provisions in U.S. 
law “must always be restricted in construction, to places and persons, upon whom 
the Legislature have authority and jurisdiction”); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit 
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (“Words having universal scope, such as ‘every contract 
in restraint of trade,’ ‘every person who shall monopolize,’ etc., will be taken, as a 
matter of course, to mean only everyone subject to such legislation, not all that the 
legislator subsequently may be able to catch.”). 
 283 Scalia, supra note 220, at 588 (“Consistency is the very foundation of the 
rule of law. . . .  [C]onsistency has a special role to play in judge-made law.”); 
Manning, supra note 213, at 285 (Textualists “want clearly established background 
rules of construction to guide legislators and interpreters in decoding textual 
commands.”). 
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3. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: ORDINARY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
AND A CONSISTENT PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
FOR AMBIGUOUS AND UNIVERSALLY WORDED STATUTES 
The extraterritorial reach of many statutes can be determined by 
applying ordinary tools of textualist statutory interpretation, 
including reading the text in context and with reference to linguistic 
canons.  Where such simple interpretation is sufficient, courts 
seeking to comply with textualist tenets should no longer apply the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to displace the most 
plausible reading of statutory text.  For statutes that are vague, 
ambiguous, or universally worded, textualism should be 
understood to favor adopting one consistent test rather than 
affording courts discretion to decide extraterritoriality on a case by 
case basis.  Determining the precise contours of the canon is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but the most plausible option appears to be 
that adopted in the Supreme Court’s early decisions on the topic—
namely, construing statutes to comply with international law limits 
on legislative jurisdiction. 
3.1. Many Cases in Which the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Is Invoked Could and Should Be Resolved Using Ordinary 
Statutory Interpretation 
U.S. courts often invoke the presumption against 
extraterritoriality where the geographic scope of a statute can be 
discerned by reference to ordinary tools of textualist statutory 
interpretation.  In some such cases, courts cite the presumption in 
order to displace the most plausible reading of the statutory text, 
which, as discussed above, is contrary to textualist tenets.  Judges 
seeking to comply with textualism should no longer rely on the 
presumption in those circumstances.  In other cases, U.S. courts cite 
the presumption against extraterritoriality only to bolster the most 
plausible reading of statutory text.  In those cases, the presumption 
is superfluous because courts would reach the same result without 
reference to the canon, but there is no real harm to invoking the 
presumption from a textualist perspective.  Neither scenario 
requires the presumption against extraterritoriality to function as a 
tiebreaker for ambiguous statutes or to supply a narrowing 
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construction for universally worded statutory text; such cases are 
addressed in Section B. 
In Aramco, for instance, the Court relied on the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to reach a result that was contrary to the 
most plausible reading of the statute.  The question presented was 
whether the prohibitions on employment discrimination of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied to a U.S. corporation’s 
employment of Ali Boureslan, a U.S. citizen, in Saudi Arabia.284  Title 
VII contained an “alien exemption provision,” which provided that 
the statute “shall not apply to an employer with respect to the 
employment of aliens outside any State.”285  The alien exemption 
provision assumed that Title VII generally applies abroad by 
excepting certain extraterritorial matters—the employment of aliens 
outside the United States—from regulation.286  The alien exemption 
provision thus made it relatively clear that Title VII applies to aliens 
employed in the United States and U.S. citizens employed both 
inside and outside the United States. 
The Supreme Court nonetheless held that Title VII did not apply 
to the extraterritorial employment of U.S. citizens by U.S. 
corporations.  The Court applied the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as a clear statement rule and thus searched for “the 
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed,” rather than 
for the best interpretation of the statutory text.287  The Court held 
that the alien exemption provision did not meet that standard 
because interpreting Title VII to apply to U.S. employers of U.S. 
citizens abroad would extend the statute to foreign employers of U.S. 
citizens abroad as well.288  The Court was “unwilling” to interpret 
Title VII to apply to foreign employers of U.S. citizens abroad, 
“which would raise difficult issues of international law,” absent 
“clearer evidence of congressional intent to do so.”289 
 
 284 EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991). 
 285 Id. at 253 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)).  The jurisdictional provisions of 
Title VII were broad enough to encompass the case before the Supreme Court, as 
they rendered Title VII applicable to employers “engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce,” which was in turn defined to include “trade . . . between a State and 
any place outside thereof.”  Id. at 249 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (g)). 
 286 Id. at 267 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 287 Id. at 248, 258 (majority opinion). 
 288 Id. at 255 (“[W]e see no way of distinguishing in [the alien exemption 
provision’s] application between United States employers and foreign 
employers.”). 
 289 Id.  
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The dissent in Aramco rightly concluded that the “available 
indicia of Congress’ intent” established that Title VII applied 
extraterritorially to Boureslan’s employment, and the majority had 
used the presumption to displace “insufficiently strong” 
congressional intent.290  In addition, adopting the most plausible 
reading of the alien exemption provision and applying Title VII to 
U.S. employers of U.S. citizens abroad would not automatically 
extend the statute to foreign employers, as the Aramco majority 
feared.  The reference to “an employer” in Title VII may be limited 
consistently with textualist tenets pursuant to the longstanding 
background convention that universal statutory language is subject 
to territorial limitation by the courts.291  Courts could, for instance, 
construe the reference to “an employer” in Title VII consistently 
with international law limits on legislative jurisdiction, likely 
precluding the application of Title VII to foreign employers in most 
cases.292 
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court likewise relied on the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to displace the most plausible 
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.293  The ATS was enacted in 
1789 and provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”294  
The Court had previously in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain295 interpreted 
the ATS to grant federal courts jurisdiction to recognize certain 
 
 290 Id. at 262, 266 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 291 Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1)(a). 
 292 As discussed above, courts seeking to comply with textualist tenets should 
uniformly apply one doctrinal test to statutes that are ambiguous or universally 
worded.  See supra note 283 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 324-29 and 
accompanying text.  The contents of that new substantive canon are beyond the 
scope of this Article, but the most plausible option appears to be construing statutes 
to comply with international law limits on legislative jurisdiction. 
 293 The Court in Kiobel held that “[t]he principles underlying the presumption 
against extraterritoriality . . . constrain courts exercising their power under the 
ATS.”  569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013).  For purposes of assessing whether U.S. courts rely 
on the presumption to displace the most plausible reading of statutory text, it makes 
no difference whether the Court’s ruling is framed as an extension of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to a jurisdictional statute or application of 
the principles underlying it. 
 294 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). 
 295 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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causes of action under international law.296  The Court had 
determined that the ATS was drafted to address a “narrow set of 
violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and 
at the same time threatening serious consequences in international 
affairs,” namely “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”297  The Court had held that the 
ATS therefore grants courts jurisdiction to recognize claims “based 
on the present-day law of nations” only where they “rest on a norm 
of international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the [three] 
18th-century paradigms.”298 
At issue in Kiobel was “under what circumstances courts may 
recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for 
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a 
sovereign other than the United States.”299  The Supreme Court did 
not seek to discern the best reading of the statute, but ruled that “to 
rebut the presumption, the ATS would need to evince a clear 
indication of extraterritoriality.”300  The Court concluded that 
“nothing in the text of the statute suggests that Congress intended 
causes of action recognized under it to have extraterritorial reach” 
because violations of the law of nations “affecting aliens can occur 
either within or outside the United States.”301  While it is true that 
violations of aliens’ rights under international law can occur in U.S. 
territory, the reference in the ATS to both aliens and international 
law fairly clearly indicates that Congress was not primarily 
concerned with wholly domestic matters.302 
The better textualist reading of the ATS is instead that it permits 
federal courts to recognize substantive causes of action under 
international law in accordance with the international law 
governing prescriptive jurisdiction.303  The ATS grants U.S. courts 
jurisdiction to hear certain claims for violations “of the law of 
 
 296 Id. at 724. 
 297 Id. at 715. 
 298 Id. at 725. 
 299 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 112-13 (2013). 
 300 Id. at 118 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 301 Id. 
 302 Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (holding that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality “rests on the perception that Congress 
ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters”). 
 303 See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 132 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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nations or a treaty of the United States.”304  The substantive 
international law that federal courts may recognize pursuant to the 
ATS is subject to no territorial limitation, but international law 
restricts states’ exercise of legislative jurisdiction.  The ATS’s grant 
of jurisdiction to recognize as federal common law (and thus U.S. 
domestic law) causes of action under international law should be 
understood to incorporate those international law limits on states’ 
prescriptive jurisdiction as well.  In the absence of any statutory 
provision addressing the extraterritorial reach of the ATS, that 
reading best approximates the statute’s objectified intent, or the 
“intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the 
law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”305 
In addition, the historical context in which the ATS was enacted 
indicates that its grant of jurisdiction is not limited to causes of 
action that arise in or touch and concern U.S. territory, as the 
Supreme Court held.306  Piracy was one of the three paradigmatic 
18th-century offenses that the Sosa Court concluded “was probably 
on minds of the men who drafted the ATS.”307  As Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion in Kiobel observed, piracy takes place not just on 
the high seas beyond U.S. borders, but on ships, which are generally 
considered to be subject to the jurisdiction of the country whose flag 
they fly.308  This historical backdrop to the ATS leaves little doubt 
that it was likely expected to apply beyond U.S. borders on ships 
that may well be subject to the jurisdiction of another state.  The 
Kiobel majority sought to diminish the importance of the piracy 
example on the basis that applying U.S. law to pirates on the high 
seas had “less direct foreign policy consequences” because it 
generally did not impose “the sovereign will of the United States 
onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another 
sovereign.”309  Even assuming that the foreign policy consequences 
are lessened where U.S. law is applied in another state’s jurisdiction, 
but not its territorial jurisdiction, the point still holds that the ATS 
was fairly clearly intended to have some extraterritorial application. 
 
 304 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 305 Manning, supra note 5, at 16. 
 306 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25. 
 307 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004). 
 308 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 130 (Breyer, J., concurring); McCulloch v. Sociedad 
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 502 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987). 
 308 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 130 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 309 Id. at 121 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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In Smith, by contrast, the Supreme Court invoked the 
presumption against extraterritoriality only to bolster its conclusion 
that the FTCA did not apply to tortious acts or omissions by the 
United States in Antarctica.310  The Court “turn[ed] first to the 
language of” the FTCA’s foreign country exception, which provided 
that “the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to 
‘[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.’”311  The Court held that the 
“commonsense meaning of the term” “country” included spaces 
like Antarctica, with no recognized government.312  Acknowledging 
that the foreign-country exception was susceptible to multiple 
interpretations, the Court then turned to other provisions in the 
FTCA to reinforce its conclusion that the FTCA does not apply in 
Antarctica.313  Only then did the Court cite the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, holding that it required “that any lingering doubt 
regarding the reach of the FTCA be resolved against its 
encompassing torts committed in Antarctica.”314  The presumption 
was thus superfluous, and textualists could have resolved the case 
in exactly the same way solely by reference to the text of the FTCA. 
In sum, the geographic scope of many U.S. statutes can be 
determined by reference to ordinary tools of textualist statutory 
interpretation.  In cases like Smith, courts cite the presumption only 
to bolster the result they would have reached via ordinary statutory 
interpretation.  The presumption against extraterritoriality is 
superfluous in such cases, and there is no real harm or benefit from 
a textualist perspective in citing the canon.  In cases like Aramco and 
Kiobel, by contrast, the presumption is used to displace the most 
plausible interpretation of the statutory text, read in context and 
against the remainder of the corpus juris.   
Judges seeking to comply with textualist tenets should instead 
adopt the most plausible reading of the text and should no longer 
rely on the presumption against extraterritoriality to change the 
outcome in such cases.  More specifically, textualist judges should 
 
 310 Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201-04 (1993); see supra note 99. 
 311 507 U.S. at 201 (quoting Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)). 
 312 Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 609 (2d ed. 1945)). 
 313 Id. at 201-03.  For example, the Court determined that interpreting the 
FTCA to apply in Antarctica would lead to a “bizarre result” because the statute 
waives sovereign immunity only where tortious conduct would incur liability “in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,” and 
Antarctica has “no law.” Id. at 201-02 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b)).   
 314 Id. at 203-04 (emphasis added). 
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seek to discern a statute’s extraterritorial reach by reference to 
traditional textualist tools of statutory interpretation, including 
focusing on the statute’s objectified intent along with permissible 
canons of statutory interpretation.  Where that analysis permits a 
textualist judge to determine a statute’s extraterritorial reach—or the 
most plausible interpretation of the statute’s extraterritorial reach—
the judge should not turn to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to reach a different result.  
3.2. Textualism Should Require Adopting a Consistent Canon for 
Determining the Extraterritorial Reach of Ambiguous and 
Universally Worded Statutes 
In some cases, statutes will prove indeterminate as to their 
extraterritorial reach even after application of ordinary tools of 
textualist statutory interpretation,315 including universally phrased 
statutes that refer, for example, to “any seaman,”316 or “every 
contract.”317  Textualism would permit a substantive canon to 
resolve this statutory indeterminacy, but courts have varied the 
presumption against extraterritoriality so significantly over the past 
two centuries that there is no single test for courts to apply.  In these 
circumstances, textualism currently provides only that judges faced 
with a statute that is indeterminate as to its geographic scope must 
exercise discretion and resort to a measure of judicial lawmaking in 
choosing which doctrinal test to apply.  That conclusion is 
unsatisfactory because it is contrary to the textualist principle that 
the law should be applied consistently, enabling voters to hold 
Congress accountable for its actions.  Textualism should instead be 
understood to require adopting a consistent approach for construing 
the extraterritorial reach of statutes that are ambiguous or 
universally worded. 
 
 315 See sources cited supra note 24; F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran, 542 
U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (explaining that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
helps construe “ambiguous statutes”). 
 316 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1953) (citing Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§ 688 (1952) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30104)). 
 317 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (quoting Eight Hour Law, 
Pub. L. No. 199, § 1, 37 Stat. 137, 137 (1912) (repealed 1962)).  As discussed above, 
there is a background convention that such universally phrased statutes are subject 
to some territorial limitation and should not be read to apply worldwide.  See supra 
notes 279-83 and accompanying text.  
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Textualists recognize that statutes inevitably contain ambiguity 
and gaps, and that judges have substantial discretion in those cases.  
Textualists contend that “no statute can be entirely precise, and that 
the elaboration of statutory detail inevitably takes place outside the 
formal confines of bicameralism and presentment.”318  They 
conceive of statutory ambiguity as “essentially a delegation of 
policymaking authority to the governmental actor charged with 
interpreting a statute,” and believe that “it is no violation of the 
obligation of faithful agency for a court to exercise the discretion that 
Congress has given it.”319  Textualists therefore recognize that 
“statutory indeterminacy . . . may at times involve judges in the 
exercise of substantial policymaking discretion.”320 
Textualism thus could appear to accord judges discretion to 
construe statutes that are indeterminate as to their extraterritorial 
reach by reference to any of the iterations of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality or, potentially, their own policy preferences rather 
than any of the iterations.  To be sure, textualists acknowledge the 
legitimacy of relying on substantive canons in exercising a court’s 
discretion to resolve statutory indeterminacy,321 and would permit a 
canon to resolve indeterminacy with respect to such a statute’s 
geographic scope.  Critically, however, no such canon currently 
exists due to the inconsistent and variable application of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality that has produced numerous 
doctrinal tests without any coherent framework as to when which 
test should apply.322 In these circumstances, textualism should be 
understood to require the development of a consistent canon of 
statutory interpretation for determining the extraterritorial reach of 
ambiguous and universally worded statutes. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the need for such 
consistency.  In Morrison, RJR Nabisco, and WesternGeco, the Court 
sought to formulate an iteration of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality that could be applied consistently and predictably 
and that would thus respond to these criticisms.  Importantly, 
 
 318 Manning, supra note 10, at 699 (internal quotation marks and footnote 
omitted); see also id. (“All general legal texts require exposition when applied to 
particular fact situations.”). 
 319 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 123. 
 320 See Manning, supra note 10, at 701; see also SCALIA, supra note 5, at 35 
(“Whatever Congress has not itself prescribed is left to be resolved by the executive 
or (ultimately) the judicial branch.”). 
 321 Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 123. 
 322 See supra notes 258-68 and accompanying text. 
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however, while the Court has twice affirmed the Morrison analysis 
over the past decade, significant questions remain about when the 
Morrison analysis applies, what it requires, and whether it can be 
administered coherently.  It remains at best unclear whether the 
newest iteration of the presumption against extraterritoriality will 
or should apply in the long term.323 
It is important to textualist principles that a consistent 
formulation of the presumption be adopted.  A consistently applied 
canon for statutes that are indeterminate as to their extraterritorial 
reach would further textualist tenets in several ways.  First, adopting 
a uniform rule would further the textualist principle that “the law 
must be consistent,”324 and would give fair notice of the conduct a 
statute regulates.325  (Consistent and predictable application of the 
law is, of course, a fundamental principle that is embraced by all 
schools of statutory interpretation,326 and it should weigh in favor of 
a uniform approach to extraterritoriality for each of them).  Second, 
a consistent test would serve “[t]extualism’s simple ambition . . . to 
require legislators to accept responsibility for their legislative 
acts.”327  Regardless whether legislators actually take the canons into 
account in drafting statutes,328 a clear rule about how the text will be 
 
 323 See supra notes 174-90 and accompanying text. 
 324 Scalia, supra note 220, at 588; Frickey, supra note 278, at 207-08 (“If the new 
formalism has not resulted in greater predictability and certainty, however, it has 
failed on its own terms.”); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
74, 127-28 (2000) (“Justice Scalia . . . has said about the canons of construction that 
‘[w]hat is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a 
background of clear interpretive rules,’ which suggests that any clearly established 
canonical default rule is better than judicial vacillation between the possible rules.” 
(quoting Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989))). 
 325 In addition to providing notice of the law, a consistently applied canon 
would also save public and private resources by encouraging settlements and 
reducing litigation to determine whether a law applies extraterritorially. 
 326 See Scalia, supra note 220, at 588 (“Consistency is the very foundation of the 
rule of law. . . .  [Y]ou will search long and hard to find anyone, in any age, who 
would reject the fundamental principle underlying the equal protection clause: that 
persons similarly situated should be similarly treated—that is to say, the principle 
that the law must be consistent.”); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the 
Canons, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1389, 1420 (2005) (“Consistency has the potential, after 
all, to reap efficiency gains both for the drafters of legislation (who may predict how 
their creation will be interpreted . . .) as well as those actors who must adapt their 
behavior based upon a prediction of how the court will interpret certain statutory 
law . . . .”). 
 327 Manning, supra note 10, at 738. 
 328 See Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 224, at 945-47 (showing that 
congressional counsel involved in drafting statutes were generally not familiar with 
many of the substantive canons). 
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construed permits voters to hold Congress accountable for the 
predictable outcomes of legislation.329  Finally, developing one 
consistent doctrinal test rather than permitting courts to pick among 
the doctrinal tests applied in the past and their own policy 
preferences best accords with courts’ consistent recognition that a 
test is required in order to address ambiguity on extraterritoriality, 
even if courts have thus far been unable to settle on one.  
There are a variety of potential ways of determining U.S. 
statutes’ geographic scope, but each approach is subject to criticism.  
Whether and to what extent U.S. law should be read to apply 
extraterritorially absent clear congressional instructions is a 
complex and difficult policy question and, as experience 
demonstrates, there are no easy answers.  That said, the most 
plausible approach appears to be a presumption that Congress 
intends to legislate up to the limits imposed by U.S. conceptions of 
public and private international law,330 at least with respect to civil 
law.331  Relying on public international law to construe ambiguous 
 
 329 Cf. John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 351, 388 (2010) (“Only canons capable of predictable application enable 
courts to produce the interpretive backdrop that allows Congress, the executive, 
and others affected by federal statutes to understand how they are likely (albeit not 
certain) to be applied.”). 
 330 Numerous commentators have argued in favor of an approach that takes 
into account international law on prescriptive jurisdiction.  E.g., Born, supra note 21, 
at 82 (“[C]ourts could presume that Congress has extended federal law to the limits 
prescribed by the principles of international law currently prevailing in the United 
States.”); Knox, supra note 329, at 353 (arguing in favor of a “renewed presumption 
against extrajurisdictionality,” the strength of which “would depend on the 
international law of legislative jurisdiction”); O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1087-88 
(arguing that for civil cases “it makes sense to revert to the Court’s historical 
practice of (1) determining, with reference to normal canons of statutory 
interpretation, the appropriate geographical scope of a statute in light of the 
statute’s policy objectives and (2) applying the Charming Betsy canon as a means of 
determining whether the extraterritorial reach of a statute would offend 
international law”).  U.S. conceptions of public international law on prescriptive 
jurisdiction and private international law conflict of laws principles are currently 
the subject of much discussion and debate.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 405-413 (AM. LAW. INST. 2018); 
Donald Earl Childress III, International Conflict of Laws and the New Conflicts 
Restatement, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 361 (2017).  Defining the exact contours that 
a new international law presumption would take in light of these ongoing 
developments is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 331 Some scholars have cogently argued that criminal law should be subject to 
a separate, stricter presumption against extraterritoriality based on “foundational 
separation of power and legality principles that are central in criminal adjudication 
but that are not applicable in civil cases.”  O’Sullivan, supra note 19, at 1089; cf. 
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statutes avoids international strife by ensuring that the exercise of 
U.S. legislative jurisdiction abroad is viewed as legitimate by the 
international community.332  Furthermore, construing U.S. law to 
comply with conflict of laws principles that require courts to balance 
the interests of different states with connections to a dispute would 
minimize conflicts with other states’ laws while ensuring that U.S. 
law is likely to apply where the United States has substantial 
regulatory interests.333  In addition, U.S. courts have long applied 
public and private international law principles in order to interpret 
federal statutes’ extraterritorial reach.334  While courts have not 
applied those principles uniformly, choosing an approach with a 
strong historical foundation is more consistent with textualists’ 
embrace of longstanding background conventions than a novel or 
infrequently applied test would be. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of the tests that courts might adopt to construe 
ambiguous or universally worded statutes, but courts should not 
follow the two-part analysis set forth in Morrison and RJR Nabisco or 
turn to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  As 
discussed above, the Morrison analysis is difficult to administer 
consistently and predictably for at least two reasons.  First, the 
Supreme Court has defined the “focus” of a statute so broadly as to 
provide no real guidance to lower courts, holding only that the 
“object of the statute’s solicitude . . . can turn on the conduct, parties, 
 
Steven Arrigg Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 340, 393-98 (2019) 
(“The better judicial approach should continue to balance foreign affairs and 
criminal interests, but do so in a manner that is tilted away from foreign affairs 
deference and towards criminal legal reasoning.”).  Employing different analyses 
for federal criminal and civil law does not contradict this Article’s suggestion that 
courts should pick one test and apply it uniformly.  As Professors Julie Rose 
O’Sullivan and Steven Arrigg Koh explain, additional considerations apply to 
federal criminal law, and uniformly applying two separate analyses to federal 
criminal and civil law achieves the same consistency and predictability this Article 
recommends.  
 332 Knox, supra note 329, at 382 (“If a U.S. law extends beyond the boundaries 
set by international law, it will almost unavoidably cause conflicts with other 
countries, conflicts in which the United States will be widely perceived as being in 
the wrong.”). 
 333 See generally Born, supra note 21, at 82-90. 
 334 See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 
U.S. 571 (1953); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is 
firmly established in our jurisprudence.”); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d 
Cir. 1945). 
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or interests that it regulates or protects.”335  Second, the Court has 
not provided clear instruction as to which statutory provisions must 
separately pass muster under the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in order for U.S. law to apply abroad.336  In RJR 
Nabisco, the Court held that the presumption applies regardless 
whether the statute “regulates conduct [or] affords relief”337 and 
applied the presumption separately to RICO’s private cause of 
action and liability provisions,338 while in WesternGeco it refused to 
decide whether the presumption applies separately to “general 
damages remed[ies].”339  And even though the Court has held that 
the Morrison analysis applies where “the statute in question . . . 
merely confers jurisdiction,”340 commentators have rightly doubted 
that the Court will apply the canon separately to jurisdictional 
provisions like the federal question statute.341 
A more fundamental problem with the Morrison analysis is that 
there is no reason to think that a statute’s “focus” has any relation to 
Congress’s intent as to whether the statute should apply to a cause 
of action with extraterritorial elements.342  Nor does the “focus” test 
require courts to engage with the issues that gave rise to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, including conflicts of law, 
friction with foreign nations, international law, and the feasibility of 
extending U.S. law abroad.343  Courts assessing a statute’s “focus” 
 
 335 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2138 (2018) 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
 336 See supra notes 178-90 and accompanying text. 
 337 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). 
 338 Id. at 2101-11. 
 339 138 S. Ct. at 2136-37.  Similarly, RJR Nabisco assessed the focus of RICO’s 
private right of action (the plaintiff’s injury) independently from the focus of the 
provisions imposing liability, while WesternGeco looked to the Patent Act’s 
provisions on substantive liability to determine the focus of the damages remedy.  
Supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text. 
 340 RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 341 See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. 
 342 Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 657 (“Morrison substitutes a purely judicial 
construct, ‘focus,’ that makes no pretense at all of reflecting what Congress 
wanted.”). 
 343 Parrish, supra note 176, at 1674 (“Instead of wrestling with the difficult 
questions of whether Congress intended a law to apply to foreign conduct and, if 
so, whether doing so is constitutional or consistent with international law, some 
courts have sidestepped the issue of legislative jurisdiction entirely” by “redefining 
extraterritoriality itself.”); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953) 
(holding that maritime law “has attempted to avoid or resolve conflicts between 
competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the 
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interpret the statute and may pay close attention to the statutory text 
and structure, but there is no obvious relation between this 
assessment and whether a statute should apply in a given case as a 
matter of congressional intent or policy.344  Assessing a statute’s 
focus in order to determine whether U.S. law applies thus realizes 
warnings about “textualism’s greatest risk: converting the Court’s 
role to answering a clever puzzle.”345  
The “focus” analysis thus leaves courts ill-equipped to assess the 
difficult questions presented by many complex, transnational 
cases.346  For example, in In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
 
transaction and the states or governments whose competing laws are involved,” 
and that “in dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the 
necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should we 
forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law 
to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to 
apply its law to an American transaction”). 
 344 One might argue that even though the “focus” test does not require 
assessment of conflicts of law, international law, or friction with foreign nations, it 
will still on balance lead to sensible results from a policy perspective.  That 
argument is difficult to assess (or to credit) because the Supreme Court has 
provided little guidance on how to discern a statute’s “focus.”  In addition, the 
“focus” analysis has the potential to generate conflicts of law or friction with foreign 
nations where it deems application of U.S. law to be domestic and thus permissible 
because the “focus” occurred in the United States even though significant aspects 
of the cause of action arose abroad.  See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Scope and 
Limitations of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 62, 66 
(2016) (noting the potential for “jurisdictional conflict” where “application of U.S. 
law to foreign conduct” is permissible under the Morrison analysis).  Conversely, 
the “focus” test may treat application of U.S. law as extraterritorial (and thus 
impermissible unless the presumption is rebutted) even where substantial parts of 
a cause of action occurred in the United States as long as the “focus” occurred 
abroad, and thereby potentially undermine U.S. regulatory interests.  
 345 Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: 
Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2074 (2017) 
(citing Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994)); see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—
In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816-17 (1983) (“By 
making statutory interpretation seem mechanical rather than creative, the canons 
conceal, often from the reader of the judicial opinion and sometimes from the 
writer, the extent to which the judge is making new law in the guise of interpreting 
a statute . . . .”); Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 665 (contending that the “change in 
terminology” implemented in Morrison “moves the process further away from 
statutory interpretation”). 
 346 See William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 50 
(2019) (“When a [modern financial] transaction takes place either in multiple places 
or electronically, fixating on the location of that transaction is bound to result in 
arbitrary and inconsistent decisions.  At worst, it creates loopholes for private actors 
to opt out of mandatory laws of the United States that are in part designed to 
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Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp. (“Microsoft”),347 
Microsoft sought to quash a warrant issued under the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) requiring Microsoft to import data 
stored in Ireland for delivery to federal authorities in the United 
States.  The Second Circuit ultimately concluded that the focus of the 
SCA was “on the privacy of stored communications,”348 so that 
executing the warrant “would constitute an unlawful extraterritorial 
application of the Act.”349  Whether, absent congressional 
instruction, U.S. law should be construed to permit federal 
authorities to command a U.S. company to produce data held 
extraterritorially is a hard question, especially considering the 
difficulty localizing the data in a meaningful way.350  Rather than 
providing for courts to consider and address the issues that make 
the question difficult—such as the potentially conflicting interests of 
the United States and Ireland and whether international law would 
permit such a warrant—Morrison requires courts to solve “a clever 
puzzle” and discern a statutory focus that has no bearing on whether 
a statute should apply as a matter of congressional intent or 
policy.351 
In adopting the two-step Morrison analysis, the Supreme Court 
sought to establish a clear rule for resolving cases with 
extraterritorial elements, in line with “formalist themes of 
 
safeguard the general public’s interest at large.”); Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1044 
(In Morrison, “the Court essentially returned the law to the old vested rights theory 
in choice of law, in which an entire multijurisdictional claim was ‘localized’ based 
on a single element. . . .  But the idea that localizing a multijurisdictional claim to 
one jurisdiction and then applying that jurisdiction’s laws to all elements of the 
claim somehow does not implicate extraterritoriality is to engage in a legal 
fiction.”); Simowitz, supra note 177, at 389 (“[T]he focus test has divided and 
perplexed the courts.”). 
 347 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated as moot and remanded sub nom. United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
 348 Id. at 217. 
 349 Id. at 220.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but before the case was 
heard Congress enacted legislation overturning the Second Circuit’s ruling and 
providing that a service provider must disclose data in its “possession, custody, or 
control, regardless of whether such communication, record, or other information is 
located within or outside of the United States.”  Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of 
Data Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2713; see generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 
1186 (2018) (per curiam). 
 350 See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. 
L. REV. 373, 407-08 (2014). 
 351 See Simowitz, supra note 177, at 403 (arguing with respect to the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Microsoft that it is not clear “why the larger question of which 
sovereign’s law should apply should turn on server location”). 
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predictability and judicial restraint.”352  The Supreme Court itself 
explained in Morrison that “the wisdom of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality” was to supply “a stable background against 
which Congress can legislate with predictable effects” “[r]ather than 
guess anew in each case.”353  But the mechanical test set forth in 
Morrison—like any mechanical test—is ill-suited to resolving the 
difficult questions raised by complex transnational cases.354  While 
“textualists may in practice have a predilection for rules,”355 the rule 
set forth in Morrison does not further textualist ends of consistency 
and predictability.  
Courts may also be tempted to turn to the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment for the contents of a new presumption against 
extraterritoriality.  Over the past thirty years, federal appellate 
courts have increasingly interpreted the Due Process Clause to limit 
the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. law.356  With respect to 
criminal legislation, federal appellate courts generally focus on 
whether application of the law to the defendant would be arbitrary 
 
 352 Colangelo, supra note 1, at 1044; Buxbaum, supra note 344, at 62 (referring 
to “the Court’s continuing quest to identify categorical, territory-based rules 
governing the application of U.S. statutes in cases involving significant foreign 
elements”). 
 353 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010). 
 354 See Buxbaum, supra note 344, at 62 (arguing that “like other recent 
decisions, RJR raises doubt as to the sufficiency of such [categorical, territory-based] 
rules to address the messy and often unpredictable patterns of transnational 
economic activity”); Moon, supra note 346, at 52 (arguing that an “‘aggregate 
contacts’ test allows courts to progressively develop case law that adapts to new 
forms of cross-border commercial transactions that will continue to challenge 
territorially defined laws”); Zachary D. Clopton, Territoriality, Technology, and 
National Security, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 45 (2016) (“On issues of technology and 
national security, territorial rules seem particularly ill suited: territorial rules aspire 
to certainty, but technology makes it harder to define ‘territoriality’ in a consistent 
and predictable way; technology weakens territoriality as a proxy for policy goals 
because data often move in ways disconnected with the interests of users and 
lawmakers; and technology makes it easier for public or private actors to 
circumvent territorial rules . . . .”). 
 355 Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 193, at 424. 
 356 See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 121, 159-65 (2007).  No circuit to consider the issue has rejected the 
applicability of the Due Process Clause, but the D.C. Circuit has deferred ruling on 
the issue.  In re Sealed Case, 936 F.3d 582, 593-94 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (concluding that 
the “ultimate question under the Due Process Clause . . . is whether application of 
the statute to the defendant would be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair,” but 
withholding judgment on “whether the Due Process Clause constrains the 
extraterritorial application of federal criminal laws at all” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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or fundamentally unfair,357 but courts sometimes disagree on what 
that test entails.358  The law is much less developed in the civil 
context, but a few circuits have indicated that the Due Process 
Clause would impose limits here too.359  The Supreme Court has not 
 
 357 United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2016); United States 
v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3rd Cir. 2002); United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 
547, 552-54 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Murillo, 826 F.3d 152, 157 (4th Cir. 
2016); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 552-53 (1st Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 393 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 
918-19 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 371-73 (9th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 723-24 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Baston, 818 
F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016); cf. In re Sealed Case, 936 F.3d at 593-94. 
 358 See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1323-35 (2014) (arguing that “courts have spawned multiple 
tests for evaluating whether exercises of U.S. extraterritorial prescriptive 
jurisdiction satisfy due process”).  For instance, courts disagree whether and when 
the Due Process Clause requires a nexus between a defendant’s criminal conduct 
and the United States for crimes committed by foreigners aboard foreign vessels 
where the flag nation consents to the application of U.S. law.  Compare United States 
v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that consent of the foreign 
state to the application of U.S. law aboard a vessel flying the foreign state’s flag 
“does not eliminate the nexus requirement” that the Due Process Clause imposes), 
with Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 403 (holding that no nexus is required where the 
criminalized conduct “is condemned universally by law-abiding nations,” and that 
“consent from the flag nation eliminates a concern that the application of the 
[federal drug trafficking law] may be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair”), and 
Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553 (“[D]ue process does not require the government to prove 
a nexus between a defendant’s criminal conduct and the United States in a 
prosecution under [a drug trafficking law] when the flag nation has consented to 
the application of United States law to the defendants.”).  Courts also have different 
conceptions of the role of international law in the due process analysis.  See Cardales, 
168 F.3d at 553 (“In determining whether due process is satisfied, we are guided by 
principles of international law.”); Baston, 818 F.3d at 669 (holding that 
“[c]ompliance with international law satisfies due process because it puts a 
defendant on notice that he could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the United 
States” (internal quotation marks omitted), but “is not necessary to satisfy due 
process”); Rojas, 812 F.3d at 392-93 (treating international law and the Due Process 
Clause as two distinct hurdles to extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law); 
Caicedo, 47 F.3d at 372 (“Principles of international law are useful as a rough guide 
in determining whether application of the statute would violate due process.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 359 See Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 
147 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Congress’s power to impose civil penalties for 
fraud in predominately foreign securities transactions is limited only by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.) S.A.L., 730 
F.2d 1103, 1107 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984) (observing in dicta that certain extraterritorial 
federal legislation “could be challenged as violating the due process clause”); 
DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Obviously . . . the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment places bounds upon congressional efforts to 
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yet determined whether the Due Process Clause restricts Congress’s 
constitutional authority to legislate extraterritorially.360 
As courts develop a uniform presumption against 
extraterritoriality, they should not simply presume that federal law 
extends up to any bounds set by the Due Process Clause.361  Any 
restrictions imposed on U.S. law by the Due Process Clause are 
constitutional outer bounds that do not necessarily indicate to what 
extent U.S. law should apply within those outer limits as a matter of 
likely congressional intent or of policy.  Additionally, federal courts’ 
disagreement over the requirements imposed by the Due Process 
Clause with respect to criminal legislation along with the lack of 
cases refining any such requirements for civil legislation pose a 
practical impediment to this approach.  Courts developing a 
uniform presumption against extraterritoriality may nonetheless 
find it useful to draw on the analyses of international law on 
prescriptive jurisdiction362 and fairness to defendants363 that have 
been developed in the due process context.  The critical point for 
present purposes is not the precise content of the substantive canon 
of statutory interpretation for determining the geographic scope of 
ambiguous statutes, but that textualism should be understood to 
favor adopting a consistent approach in these circumstances. 
 
apply American rules of decision to transactions in which the United States has no 
sufficient interest.  In this respect, in the international arena, fifth amendment due 
process serves the same purpose as does fourteenth amendment due process with 
respect to the states.”). 
 360 Stigall, supra note 20, at 347. 
 361 Whether courts have correctly interpreted the Due Process Clause to limit 
the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. law is beyond the scope of this Article and 
has been the subject of scholarly debate.  Compare Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, 
Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 
1223 (1992) (“It is our thesis that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause limits 
federal actions in much the same manner that the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause limits state actions.”), with A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on 
Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 427 (1997) 
(arguing that “the Fifth Amendment does not operate to limit Congress in this 
way”), and Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 323, 338-41 (warning that “it may be logically awkward for a defendant to rely 
on what could be characterized as an extraterritorial application of the U.S. 
Constitution in an effort to block the extraterritorial application of U.S. law”). 
 362 See, e.g., United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir. 
2011) (holding that international law permits all states to exercise prescriptive 
jurisdiction aboard stateless vessels). 
 363 See, e.g., United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 723-24 (9th Cir. 2008). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
608 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:3 
4. CONCLUSION 
The presumption against extraterritoriality is incompatible with 
textualism insofar as it is used to displace the most plausible reading 
of the statutory text because courts have not applied the canon 
consistently enough for it to become part of the closed set of 
background conventions.  Rather, courts have applied a multitude 
of different, inconsistent iterations of the presumption, invoking an 
equally diverse set of rationales.  Ironically, the Morrison analysis 
that the Supreme Court has developed over the past decade, in part 
to address these difficulties, presents particular problems for 
textualism because it is wholly new and it supplants insufficiently 
clear congressional instructions that a statute applies 
extraterritorially.  Judges seeking to comply with textualist tenets 
should therefore resolve statutes by reference to the best reading of 
the statutory text in context wherever possible, and they should not 
rely on the presumption against extraterritoriality to reach a 
contrary result. 
Courts’ consistent reliance on a presumption against 
extraterritoriality in one form or another nonetheless gives rise to a 
background convention that statutes with universal language, 
referring to “any contract” or “any seaman,” are not meant to apply 
throughout the world.  Textualists can construe such universally 
worded statutes to have some territorial limits consistently with 
textualism.  Critically, however, textualism should be understood to 
require, but has not yet produced, a consistent approach for 
resolving the extraterritorial reach of such universally worded 
statutes and of statutes that are otherwise ambiguous as to their 
geographic scope.  A canon assuming that Congress legislates up to 
the limits set by private and public international law is the most 
likely contender. 
That conclusion points to a broader insight about textualism.  
Just as textualism would otherwise provide no meaningful guidance 
on interpreting statutes that are ambiguous as to their geographic 
scope, textualism generally does not aid courts in construing truly 
ambiguous statutes, beyond conceding that they entail some judicial 
discretion or lawmaking.  For these statutes, textualism is 
incomplete and leaves judges to reach varying conclusions based on 
their own discretion.  
In some circumstances, textualism can be augmented with new 
substantive canons to resolve these issues.  Where, as for statutes 
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that are ambiguous as to their extraterritorial reach, numerous 
statutes over time present the same or similar recurring questions of 
statutory interpretation, textualism should provide for the adoption 
of a new, consistently-applied substantive canon.364  In those cases, 
the judicial discretion inherent in ambiguous statutes can and 
should be harnessed to require judges to decide similar cases 
uniformly over time according to a substantive canon.  Judges 
thereby grant litigants enhanced notice of the law, provide Congress 
with a stable background rule against which to legislate, and thus 
hold Congress accountable for its legislation. 
 
 
 364 See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, A Defense of Substantive Canons of Construction, 
2001 UTAH L. REV. 915, 942 (“The most obvious benefit to the legal system of judges 
developing rules of interpretation to resolve hard cases is that the articulation and 
implementation of these rules will increase predictability and coherence of the 
law.”); Coney Barrett, supra note 6, at 124 (Canons that implement 
extraconstitutional values “are a useful way of specifying the social values that 
should influence judges in resolving statutory ambiguity.”). 
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